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       Executive Summary 
Situational Overview: Ports are complex multi-actor institutions with multiple overlaid 
jurisdictions. Generally, the private sector provides the majority of services for unloading and 
loading of cargo, yet most port security responsibilities are legally under the public sector.  
This series of six case studies examines “best practices” aimed at improving the management and 
security of the private sector to halt criminal activity as terrorism, human trafficking, narcotics, 
and stolen goods. Executive summaries of the case studies follow.  
 “Core Ports and Private Sector Management” Core American ports fall into five models, in 
general combining public ownership and private management. The direction is toward further 
privatization and landlord ports are the most common model where terminals are leased by 
private companies from the public sector. America has 182 ports, and core ports are rated on 
tonnage, number of containers (TEUs), and dollar volume. Los Angles, New York and Long 
Beach are highly rated in all three categories. Houston, the Port of South Louisiana, Beaumont, 
TX; Savannah, GA; and Norfolk, VA round out the other core ports. Quality, time and costs 
represent the “iron triangle” of core port reliability. All American ports are regulated by the 
Federal Maritime Administration (MARAD). Best practices involve improving communication 
and expanding the landlord model.  
“Port Security and Private Sector Engagement in Port Security” Port efficiency is dependent 
on an interconnected system of maritime, terminal and hinterland operations. Inland Port 
Intermodal (IPI) is traditionally the most common method of offloading cargo and disseminating 
goods. The security of U.S. ports is under the jurisdiction of the United States Coast Guard 
(USCG) under U.S. Code Title 46, Subtitle VII, Chapter 701, and Subchapter I. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) through the Container Security Initiative (CSI) enhances the security 
advance screening of cargo before it is loaded onto ships coming to the US; as does the Customs-
Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) geared towards securing the supply chain. 
Transportation Security Agency (TSA) helps implement security with the Transportation Worker 
Identification Credentialing (TWIC) by biometrically verifying personnel accessing maritime 
ports. Best practice recommendations note that it is imperative there be an increase in 
information sharing between the private and public sector through cross-governmental multi-
agency collaboration plus updated safety bulletins. P25 compliant radio systems now allow ports 
to communicate with local law enforcement officers.   
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“Private Sector Elimination of Criminal Activity and Security Gaps” Private sector ports 
identify criminal activity and security gaps via internal security programs and external agencies. 
Their risk management security system established mitigates, prevents, responds, and recovers 
from any perceived threat. Utilizing law enforcement data and through conducting in-house 
security reports, criminal operations’ trends and methods are located. CBP’s Customs-Trade 
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), integrates the private sector concerns to into the 
Agency’s architecture. Over 10,000 firms are certified through C-TPAT and through incentives.  
Cameras and motion detectors have been used in ports for several decades and now ports have 
shifted to the digital world. Surveillance equipment such as High performance Stabilized 
Observation Payloads used for day and night surveillance, UAVs, helicopters, and other means 
improved port security. Additionally radar sensors, sonar sensors, integrated GPS and GIS 
mapping systems and electronic card readers for access control under the TWIC program add to 
security. Best practices involve improved standardized training programs imposing a national set 
of security standards with government providing direct subsidies for increased security measures. 
Communication and information sharing will improve due to the new changes in the National 
Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS).   
 
“Private Sector Engagement and Public-Private Coordination in Port Security” U.S. port 
security is anchored in identifying gaps.  Ports offer significant risks due to the sheer daily 
volume of cargo and individuals. Most transport is via containers and the “Trojan Horse” is the 
greatest fear. The other contemporary concern is cyber security regarding maritime control 
systems, vessel networks, tracking technology, and logics software.  The Customs-Trade 
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) creates enhanced worldwide supply chain security. 
Security training is also critical, and the United States Maritime Administration had the U.S. 
Merchant Marine Academy develop it. Over 17,000 maritime security personnel have attended 
one or more of these courses. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)’s annual 
Port Security Grant Program (PGSP) is another splendid endeavor to incentivize the private sector 
to enhance port security. The U.S. Department of Justice successfully launched “Operation 
Cooperation”—a national effort to increase collaboration between the private sector and state and 
local law enforcement agencies. As well, through local Area Maritime Security Committees 
(AMSC), enhance security communication among port stakeholders and local agencies. 
Recommendations for best practices are: broaden ASMC membership; clearly spell out vessel 
diversion plans; improve incident mitigation plans; enhance port infrastructure security and 
expand the radiation based Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS).   
 
“Best Practices Recommendations for Private Sector Port Security Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs)” Port security has many contributing factors, including: shared port 
responsibility; difficulty ensuring security along the entire supply chain due to lax foreign ports 
security; plus sheer volume. President George W. Bush signed the Maritime Transportation 
Security Act (MTSA) linking contingency planning and enhanced communication. Effective 
local security Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) became the goal. Despite the establishment 
of dozens of AMSCs nationally, attracting and maintaining consistent private sector participation 
was difficult due to budgets and travel. Releasing sensitive intelligence information also became 
an issue due to security clearance requirements. But subsequent Presidential Policy Directives 
and Executive Orders attempted to underscore the need to create effective local SOPs. Currently 
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each AMSC is working at providing effective SOPs for the Captain of the Port (COTP) – the 
port responsible Coast Guard Officer. The private sector can utilize free government resources 
via the America’s Waterway Watch (AWW) for reporting suspicious activity. Frameworks are in 
place to facilitate interoperability in SOPs from the U.S. government and the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the World Customs Organization (WCO). Best 
practices entail using these frameworks to facilitate SOP interoperability. For developing SOPs, 
the Port Security Grant Program offers immense assistance for private sector port companies to 
write their port Facility Security Plan (FSP) into their SOPs.     
 
“Best Practices of Selected Asian Ports” The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia ae 
the Asian ports. The Philippine Port Authority manages all ports save one. Under the PPA, the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code establishes guidelines port security. 
The PPA also partners with the U.S. to prevent terrorist access to nuclear materials. Vietnam is 
quickly becoming a global leader in exports. Vietnam has 114 seaports with 14 larger ones key 
to economic development. However, overall sea port connectivity is hindered by unreliable 
transportation infrastructure and Vietnam has a problem with corruption. In Malaysia the narrow, 
550-mile waterway straddling Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore is a key commercial maritime 
route carrying a third of the world's trade and half of the world's oil supply. As such, security of 
the supply chain at Port Klang is of particular interest to the U.S. and CBP.  Indonesia comprises 
over 17,000 islands with 154 active ports. The majority of ports are managed by the Indonesia 
Port Corporation. The USCG found vast improvement following inspections conducted after 
Indonesia was placed on the advisory list. Best practices overall include: implementation of the 
ISPS Code abroad and continued U.S. partnerships. Examples of an excellent U.S. partnership 
were cited as key security improvements for ports in the Philippines and Malaysia. Malaysia 
partners with the U.S. and CBP in the implementation of the CSI to pre-screen containers. 
Continued funding is needed.  
Methodology: 
 
As part of the Diplomacy Laboratory, this is submitted on behalf of the Graduate Students in my 
“J 531Unied States National Security and Homeland Security” class of the Indiana University 
School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University Purdue University 
Indianapolis as part of their fall 2015 course requirement.  All students contributed to 
researching the entire manuscript and to writing it systematically and sequentially, part-time, 
throughout the fall term. At the conclusion, they then by group, edited and wrote the respective 
case studies which display their names. They are all co-authors and co-researchers and co-editors 
of this Project. 
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Situation: 
Since September 11th, 2001 there has been an increasing concern about weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) and other dangerous components that could cause serious harm. The private 
sectors play a major role regarding this concern because they are often the ones manufacturing and 
transporting individual packages that could potentially be used as a weapon if they get into the wrong 
hands.  In order to prevent such an incident, both the private and the public sectors are required to 
form a functional relationship. That relationship today around the world, not just in the U.S., is not 
where it should be and is often replete with suspicion and animosity between the two sectors.1 In 
order to prevent a future incident, lawmakers are requesting stricter regulations including increased 
port security, tighter export regulations, and a variety of other preventative measures.2 Yet these 
types of increased measures are often difficult to follow for the private sector. The government and 
lawmakers are so focused on preventing a future terrorist incident that they often do not see the harm 
                                                          
1 Finlay, Brian (2009, February 18). Minding Our Business: The Role of the Private Sector in 
Managing the WMD Supply Chain. Retrieved from http://www.Stimson.org  
2 Finlay, Brian (2009, February 18). Minding Our Business: The Role of the Private Sector in 
Managing the WMD Supply Chain. Retrieved from Retrieved from http://www.Stimson.org  
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the cause to corporate interests.3 In order to protect the world from potential dangers, there should be 
a healthy, established balance between the private and public sectors.  
The United States has a multitude of maritime ports in which it conducts business in 
importing goods, exporting goods, and transportation- all via direct ocean border location or seaway 
access.  With 182 ports handling millions of tons of waterborne activity annually, chiefly 
commodities. There is a significant amount of product tonnage being brought in and out of our 
country annually.4 And there are various ways we can measure which ports are central to the 
maritime activity of the nation.  
According to the Navigation and Civil Works Decision Support Center U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, below are the top five ports based on weight in tons both foreign and domestic moving 
through yearly:5 
1.     Port of South Louisiana, LA with 238.6 million total tons 
2.     Houston, TX with 229.2 million total tons 
3.     New York, NY/NJ with 123.3 million total tons 
4.     Beaumont, TX with 94.4 million total tons 
5.     Long Beach, CA with 84.5 million total tons 
Port traffic is also measured in twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs), which refers to the standard 
size container (Container port traffic TEU: 20 foot equivalent units), below are the numbers for 
2014.6  
                                                          
3 Finlay, Brian (2009, February 18). Minding Our Business: The Role of the Private Sector in 
Managing the WMD Supply Chain. Retrieved  from Retrieved from http://www.Stimson.org  
4 Navigation and Civil Works Decision Support Center U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. (2015, 
July 15). The U.S.Waterway System Transportation Facts & Information 2014. Retrieved from 
http://www.navigationdatacenter.us/factcard/factcard14_v1.pdf.  
5 Navigation and Civil Works Decision Support Center U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. (2015, 
July 15). The U.S.Waterway System Transportation Facts & Information 2014. Retrieved from 
http://www.navigationdatacenter.us/factcard/factcard14_v1.pdf.  
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1. Los Angeles, CA with 5,892,982 
2. Long Beach, CA with 4,933,499 
3. New York, NY with 4,276,766 
4. Savannah, GA 2,597,825 
5. Norfolk, VA 1,931,510 
The top 5 based upon dollar value of foreign traffic, based on 2013 figures: 
1. Los Angeles, CA 
 When the Panama Canal opened in 1914, it paved the way for Los Angeles, 
California to become one of our countries’ largest and busiest ports, this is determined 
by the size and amount of traffic flow through the area.7 The Port of Los Angeles is 
“North America’s leading seaport in terms by container volume and cargo value,” 
generating $290 billion in trade during 2014.8 This port is part of the City of Los Angles 
and is overseen by members of the Board of Harbor Commissioners. The port along 
with the Los Angeles Port Police force work in close collaboration with multiple 
government entities to monitor and keep safe vast miles of waterfront and land-based 
facilities, and employs one of the most comprehensive, 24/7 threat detection and 
incident management systems in the world.9 
2. New York, NY/NJ 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
6 The World Bank. (2015). Data: Container port traffic (TEU: 20 foot equivalent units). 
       Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IS.SHP.GOOD.TU/countries 
7 American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA). (2013). Glossary of Maritime Terms. AAPA. Retrieved from 
http://www.aapa-ports.org/Industry/content.cfm?ItemNumber=1077.  
8 The Port of Los Angeles. (2015). A Profile of the Port of Los Angeles. The Port of Los Angeles. Retrieved from  
       https://www.portoflosangeles.org/about/profile.asp 
9 The Port of Los Angeles. (2015). A Profile of the Port of Los Angeles. The Port of Los Angeles. Retrieved from 
https://www.portoflosangeles.org/about/profile.asp. 
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These ports moves millions of people and transports vital cargo throughout the 
new York/New Jersey region annually.10 The Port Authority of New York and New 
Jersey conceives, builds, operates, and maintains infrastructure critical to the New 
York/New Jersey region’s trade and transportation network.11  
3. Long Beach, CA 
The Port of Long Beach is owned and operated by the City of Long Beach. Even 
though both long Beach and Los Angeles are in close proximity to one another they 
aren’t the same. “The Port of Long Beach is a public agency managed and operated by 
the City of Long Beach Harbor Department, and governed by the Board of Harbor 
Commissioners.”12 The port also works closely with the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and 
Border Protection, state and federal Homeland Security offices, the Long Beach Police 
Department, and the Port’s own Harbor patrol to ensure safety of the ports.13   
4. Houston, TX 
The Port of Houston Authority is made up of seven volunteer Harris County residents 
who serve as Port Commissioners. The Port of Houston consists of a 25 mile long 
complex, and has been ranked 1st numerous times as the nation’s leader in foreign 
waterborne tonnage.14  
5. Savannah, GA 
                                                          
10 Port Authority of New York & New Jersey. (n.d.). Retrieved  from http://www.panynj.gov/ 
11 Port Authority of New York & New Jersey. (n.d.). Retrieved  from http://www.panynj.gov/  
12 Port of Long Beach, The Green Port (2015). Retrieved from http://www.polb.com/default.asp  
13 Port of Long Beach, The Green Port (2015). Retrieved from http://www.polb.com/default.asp  
14 Overview | The Port of Houston Authority. (2015). Retrieved from 
http://www.portofhouston.com/about-us/overview/  
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All the ports in Georgia, including Savannah, are run by the Georgia Ports Authority 
(GPA).15 The ports of Georgia are a quasi-state agency with a 13 member Board of 
Directors who governs the activities of the GPA.16  
These ports are our core ports.  It should be noted that ports across the globe are managed by 
regulations from various sources of governance.  Ports in the US fall under an array of jurisdictions 
to include federal, state, local, public port authority entities, port navigation districts, municipal port 
departments, all of this while still accommodating some international and foreign regulatory 
measures to ensure agreed upon trade practice.  The US has 150 deep draft seaports and 126 public 
seaport agencies with jurisdiction over these ports.17 That is nearly one regulatory/enforcement 
agency per port.  This demonstrates the varying and differing ways ports are operated and managed 
and the politics that are likely involved. 
Public ports work closely with the private industry both in the development and financing of 
marine terminals and other maritime-related facilities.18 The alignment of public and private interests 
determines the structure of port management and port development policies. They are used to 
manage port operations more efficiently and effectively.19 Although the private sector does not 
generally provide port security, they purchase and install their own equipment and are responsible for 
terminal operations. There are several reasons why ports choose privatization over public ports, 
including: 
• Removal of trade barriers 
                                                          
15 Georgia Ports Authority. (2015). About. Georgia Ports Authority. Retrieved from 
http://www.gaports.com/About.aspx  
16 Georgia Ports Authority. (2015). About. Georgia Ports Authority. Retrieved from 
http://www.gaports.com/About.aspx  
17 American Association of Port Authorities. (2013). U.S. Public Port Facts. Retrieved from http://www.aapa-
ports.org.    
18 Martino, M. (2014, February 27). Public Sector Agencies with Private Sector Expectations. Retrieved from 
http://www.nxtbook.com/naylor/AAPQ/AAPQ0114/index.php?startid=10#/10.  
19 Rapoza, K, (2014, November 11) Forbes Investing, The World’s Busiest Ports. Retrieved from 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2014/11/11/the-worlds-10-busiest-ports/.  
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• Harnessing the efficiency and expertise of the private sector 
• Elimination of political interference 
• Reduced demand on the public sector budget 
• Reduced expenditure on port labor20 
We can see varying management models when looking at how our core ports operate.  Port 
management is broken up into five models: 
Public Service ports: The port authority of public service ports performs the whole range of 
port related services, in addition to owning the entire infrastructure. They are commonly a branch of 
a government ministry and most of their employees are civil servants. Some ancillary services can be 
left to private companies. Because of the inefficiencies they are related with, the number of public 
service ports has declined.21 
Tool ports: Similar in every aspect to a public service port, the tool port differs only by the 
private handling of its cargo operations, albeit the terminal equipment is still owned by the port 
authority. In several cases, a tool port is a transitional form between a public service port and a 
landlord port.22 
Landlord ports: Represents the most common management model where infrastructures, 
particularly terminals, are leased to private operating companies with the port authority retaining 
ownership of the land. The most common form of lease is a concession agreement where a private 
company is granted a long term lease in exchange of a rent that is commonly a function of the size of 
the facility as well as the investment required to build, renovate or expand the terminal. The private 
                                                          
20 World Bank Port Reform Toolkit. (n.d). Alternative Port Management Structures and Ownership Models. 
Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRAL/Resources/338897-1117197012403/mod3.pdf.  
21 Rodrigue, D. J.-P. (1998). Public and Private Roles in Port Management. (D. o. Geography, Producer, & Hofstra University). 
Retrieved from https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch4en/conc4en/tbl_public_privte_roles_ports.html.   
22 Rodrigue, D. J.-P. (1998). Public and Private Roles in Port Management. (D. o. Geography, Producer, & Hofstra University). 
Retrieved from https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch4en/conc4en/tbl_public_privte_roles_ports.html.   
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operator is also responsible to provide terminal equipment so that operating standards are 
maintained.23 
Corporatized ports: Concerns ports that have almost entirely been privatized, with the 
exception that ownership remains public and often assumed as a majority shareholder. The port 
authority essentially behaves as a private enterprise. This management model is unique since it is the 
only one where ownership and control are separated, which lessens "public good" pressures landlord 
port authority are facing and "shareholder value" pressures private ports are facing.24 
Private Service ports. The outcome of a complete privatization of the port facility with a 
mandate is that the facilities retain their maritime role. The port authority is entirely privatized with 
almost all the port functions under private control with the public sector retaining a standard 
regulatory oversight. Still, public entities can be shareholders and thus gear the port towards 
strategies that are deemed to be of public interest.25 
The management of these ports relies on what one executive of the American Association of 
Port Authorities calls the “Iron Triangle,” which consists of “quality, time and cost.” The goal of 
running such a port, much like running any other company, is to obtain the best quality of service and 
product, in the quickest time, at the lowest cost.  Even though maritime ports are technically within 
the public sector, there has been a steady shift in the industry toward the privatization of aspects of 
port management in order to best maximize profit within this Iron Triangle.  
The ports in the United States are governed a federal agency the Maritime Administration 
(MARAD) and is responsible for assisting all U.S.-flagged ship carrying domestic and foreign goods. 
                                                          
23 Rodrigue, D. J.-P. (1998). Public and Private Roles in Port Management. (D. o. Geography, Producer, & Hofstra University). 
Retrieved from https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch4en/conc4en/tbl_public_privte_roles_ports.html.   
24 Rodrigue, D. J.-P. (1998). Public and Private Roles in Port Management. (D. o. Geography, 
Producer, & Hofstra University). Retrieved from 
https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch4en/conc4en/tbl_public_privte_roles_ports.html.   
25 Rodrigue, D. J.-P. (1998). Public and Private Roles in Port Management. (D. o. Geography, 
Producer, & Hofstra University). Retrieved from 
https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch4en/conc4en/tbl_public_privte_roles_ports.html.   
8 
 
The MARAD ensures all ships bring in goods are US-flag ships under the Jones Act (MARAD 
2015).   
“The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.  55102 (19 C.F.R. 4.80b), is one of several 
coastwise laws enforced by CBP which prohibits the transportation of cargo 
between points in the U.S., either directly or via a foreign port, or for any part 
of the transportation, in any vessel other than a vessel that has a coastwise 
endorsement, i.e. a vessel that is built in and owned by persons who are 
citizens of the United States.”26  
Although the MARAD is the federal agency over the U.S. ports each of the ports has its own agency 
that manages it. The port of Los Angeles is managed by Los Angeles Harbor commission; a five-
member board makes up the administrative body of the port, appointed by the Mayor of Los 
Angeles.27 The Port of Los Angeles prides itself on its world-class security operations along with 
homeland security operations and the nation's largest dedicated port police force. 
 The Port of Long Beach operations are managed by the Long Beach Harbor Commission, 
which is made up of over 400 employees and has 17 divisions.28 The port is governed by the Long 
Beach Board of Harbor Commissioners, which are appointed by the mayor of Long Beach and 
confirmed by the city council. Further, the board then appoints the Port Executive Director.  The Port 
lands are owned by the City of Long Beach in a trust for the people of the State of California and are 
not available to be sold to any private enterprise. 
The New York & New Jersey port is controlled by the Port Authority that is governed by a 
six-member commission appointed by the governor of each state.29 The Georgia Port Authority 
                                                          
26 U.S Customs and Border Protection (2015). What is the Jones Act? Retrieved from 
https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/23/~/the-jones-act.  
27 LA, The Port of Los Angeles, America’s Port (2015) Retrieved from https://www.portoflosangeles.org/idx_commission.asp  
28 Port of Long Beach. (2015). FAQs. Port of Long Beach. Retrieved from http://www.polb.com/about/faqs.asp 
29 Port Authority of New York & New Jersey (2015) Retrieved from http://www.panynj.gov/corporate-
information/governance.html 
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(GPA) is the managing body for the Port of Savannah. The GPA is run by a 13 member board 
appointed by the Governor and each member serves a four term, staggered.30 The Norfolk Virginia 
Port is also known has the Norfolk International Terminal (NIT). It has a port authority operation that 
is overseen by Virginia International Terminals (VIT), which is owned by the Virginia Port Authority 
(VPA).31 VIT is a limited liability company consisting of single member private organization and 
receives no funding from the VPA.32 
Each port management model has its strengths and weaknesses, though many large and 
successful ports fall under the Public Service, Tool, or Landlord Port models.  In the US, our core 
ports are primarily landlord ports in which there is a happy medium between public ownership, 
oversight, private leasing, and operation.  For example, the Port of Houston, Port of Long Beach, and 
Port of South Louisiana all have commissions that oversee the respective harbor/port authorities.  
The municipality that has jurisdiction over the port establishes these commissions with the mayor 
appointing commissioners that commonly seat them.  These commissioners are then agreed upon and 
confirmed by a city council or board and are restricted to term limits.  The commission’s job is to 
ensure smooth operation of the port, to include: administration, nautical management, infrastructure, 
security, contractor oversight for ancillary services, and regulations of privatized functions such as 
cargo handling and superstructure (warehouses, sheds, rigs, etc.).  The privatization is largely 
corporations leasing out the port authorities infrastructure to conduct business.33 This medium allows 
for the public sector to get money from leasing the space, creates jobs for the community (private and 
public), all while allowing private corporations a convenient place to conduct business. 
Recommended Improvements for Best Practices: 
                                                          
30 Georgia Port Authority (2015) Retrieved from http://www.gaports.com/About/GPABoardMembers.aspx  
31 The Port of Virginia. (2015). Norfolk International Terminal. Retrieved from 
http://www.portofvirginia.com/facilities/norfolk-international-terminals-nit/.  
32 The Port Of Virginia (2015) Norfolk International Terminal. Retrieved from 
http://www.portofvirginia.com/stewardship/economic-development/fast-facts/.  
33 The Geography of Transport Systems. (2015). Public and Private Roles in Port Management. Retrieved from 
https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch4en/conc4en/tbl_public_privte_roles_ports.html. 
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With any situation there is always something that can be improved upon. Each of the many 
U.S. ports has its own distinctions. The way the ports are operated and maintained varies, but as 
mentioned earlier the majority uses a landlord model. This type of model is generally more efficient 
because a commissioner is appointed to oversee the port and its operations. This type of role 
shouldn’t be considered a political one, but rather an expert. In order to maintain efficiency and 
effectiveness within each port there needs to be someone with knowledge about that port and 
operations, they cannot just be a figure head. Further, there needs to be communication from top to 
bottom, and also with local/federal agencies. Communication both inside and outside the port is 
extremely important to the port operations, and the safety of the community it serves.  
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Situation: 
Maritime ports are unceasingly engaged as a medium in world trade.  They are 
one of the prime avenues in which commodities are imported and exported to reach their 
desired consumer.  As previously identified, the majority of ports that are successful have 
an even split between public and private sector involvement.   
The public sector generally owns and maintains the port’s land itself, as well as 
the primary infrastructure.  Infrastructure being terminals, docks, harbors, wharfs, 
anchoring points, and so on- this is then leased out to corporations.  The public sector 
also provides policy, regulation, and enforcement/security functions for the port.  The 
private sector is responsible for superstructure development, which is any extension of 
the infrastructure, such as warehouses and hoists/lifts.  The private sector is also 
generally responsible for cargo handling.  Present in the most common model of port, the 
landlord model, the public and private sector share roles in pilotage, which is the 
directing of ship movement into port; towage, which is the movement of large vessels or 
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disabled vessels; mooring, the anchoring or docking of a boat; and dredging, the cleaning 
and maintenance of the port’s water itself. 1 
Ports are under increasing pressure to reduce costs associated with receiving and 
handing cargo. Port efficiency is dependent on an interconnected system of maritime, 
terminal and hinterland operations.  These dimensions are interconnected “since 
inefficiencies in one dimension are likely to impact the others”.2  Maritime operations are 
a critical measure in the efficiency of port operations and a factor in the overall cost of 
shipping.  Thus the ship wait times, port capacity and consequent vessel turnaround time 
is a crucial measure of port efficiency and competitiveness.3  Terminal operations are 
limited by critical bottlenecks such as crane performance and offloading capacity. 
Equally critical are hinterland operations and the speed at which cargo can be sorted and 
distributed.  This relies on efficient trans-loading and sorting procedures, transportation 
infrastructure and geographic advantage. 4 
Inland Port Intermodal (IPI) is traditionally the most common method of 
offloading cargo and disseminating goods from port to destination. Under IPI, ocean 
carriers coordinate the movement of cargo from water to land, keeping the container 
contents intact from point of origin to distribution center.  “Ocean carriers, terminal 
operators and railroads have developed the infrastructure and processes required to move 
20-, 40- and 45-foot containers — already filled with freight and sitting on their ships — 
directly onto the rail lines that ran right into the harbor or to a point nearby”.5  From there, 
                                                     
1 American Association of Port Authorities. (2013). Glossary of Maritime Terms. Retrieved September 29, 2015, from 
AAPA: http://www.aapa-ports.org/Industry/content.cfm?ItemNumber=1077 
2 Rodrigue, J.-P. (2015). The Port Performance Continuum. Retrieved from Hofstra University: 
https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch4en/conc4en/port_performance_continuum.html 
3 Tongzon, J., & Heng, W. (2005). Port privatization, efficiency and competitiveness: Some empirical evidence from 
container ports (terminals). Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 405-424. 
4 Rahimi, M., Asef-Vaziri, A., & Harrison, R. (2008). Integrating Inland Ports into the Intermodal Goods Movement 
System for Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. Metrans. 
5 Schneider. (2015, February). White Paper: Transloading Takes Over. Retrieved from Schneider: 
http://www.schneider.com/www1/groups/webassets/@marketing-public/documents/webcontent/transloading-feb2015-
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rail operators move the customer’s freight near the final delivery point, with contracted 
trucking companies completing the final mile. However, this method of cargo distribution 
has been recently challenged, with critics arguing the method results in sub-optimal cargo 
loads and inefficiencies due to the requirement for cargo to be funneled through off-site 
distribution centers. 
Landlord port security came about after the terrorist attacks of 9/11.  New rules 
called for mandated vessel inventories, security plans and assessments as well as 
screening procedures for both passengers and cargo.  The security of U.S. ports is under 
the jurisdiction of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) as part of the International Port 
Security Program (ISP).  This is done with the use of International Port Security Liaison 
Officer (IPSLO), according to the USCG website.6  The USCG does not only manage the 
security of ports locally, they work with international ports as well through reciprocal 
agree with port that the U.S. does business with 7.  The majority of ports around the 
world if not all of them work under two organizations that govern how these ports 
operate internationally.  The first is the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and 
the second is the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS)8.  U.S. Code 
Title 46, Subtitle VII, Chapter 701, and Subchapter I is the main reference for 
determining who has the legal authority or mandate to provide port security.9 
Challenges and Issues: 
It is critical to remember that a port is a border.  Therefore, the federal 
government has a key role in port security.  The Customs agency in each country 
generally works to protect the country by detecting unauthorized goods and securing the 
                                                     
6 United States Coast Guard; U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Web site 09/08/2015 
http://www.uscg.mil/d14/feact/Maritime_Security.asp 
7 Ibid 
8 Ibid 
9 Legal Information Institute [LLI], (1992), Cornell University Law School, Retrieved from: 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/46/41302 
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border; by working with fiscal revenues to ensure adequate valuation of goods; and by 
facilitating legitimate trade.10  Therefore, Customs in most countries is involved in port 
security.  In the United States, this agency is known as the Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP).  The most prominent threat to ports in the United States is the 
possibility of a terrorist attack.  Given the sheer volume of shipping containers pumped in 
and out of U.S. ports per day, it is no wonder why this is such a concern.  The CBP, 
Coast Guard, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) work with other 
federal agencies and state and local agencies to combat this constant threat.  The security 
of ports will undoubtedly continue to evolve to face the ever-changing threats to the 
homeland of the U.S. 
It is no secret that terrorist want to impose destruction on the U.S., for this reason 
security planners constantly research new ways to decrease Americas susceptibility to 
harm on our homeland.  This holds true for ports in the private sector as well.  The 
challenge for authorities not figuring out where a threat may arise from, the issue lies in 
figuring out what kind of a potential attack may occur on the ports, and how to 
effectively manage security without much funding.  It is very essential to protect and 
guard our maritime ports due to their vulnerability and vital role in our nation’s economy. 
It is mentioned over and over that communication between the government and private 
sector stakeholders must be improved.  In the past few years, our nation has improved 
intelligence aptitude dramatically since 9/11.  Threats to maritime transportation continue 
to evolve though.  Everything from weakness in infrastructure to ship security itself must 
be looked at and examined in order to implement best practices in securing the ports. 
Many feel today interagency security is lacking when it comes to effectively managing 
                                                     
10 Juhel, M. H. (2010). Management Models and Public/Private Partnerships in the Port Sector. The World Bank. 
Retrieved  from 
http://www.icafrica.org/fileadmin/documents/ICA_sponsored_events/IFC_PPP_Ports_Cairo_2010/Management%20M
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5 
 
and securing private ports because security is often left up to local authorities and the 
Coast Guard.  Improving security within private sector ports focuses on cross-
governmental multi-agency collaboration that drives policy formulation and execution. 
However, many will argue that the private sector should not enjoy the benefits of being 
protected by the government.  Often government officials disagree on the role that 
interagency should play when it comes to protecting these ports due to the fact there is no 
centralized coordinating mechanism.11 
Ports throughout the United States operate with different levels of security. The 
Port of Los Angeles has its own Los Angeles Port Police, who are the immediate 
responders and secure the property and traffic flow in and out of the port on land. The 
U.S. Coast guard is on site as well as Customs and Border Protection of DHS.12  Within 
the Port of Los Angeles, private agencies coordinate the paperwork and acceptance of 
freight, ensuring that it is within the protocol of U.S. Homeland Security regulations. 
Although these are primarily private agencies they are licensed through the local custom 
authority.  The Coast Guard has a significant role in protecting the waters around our 
nation, but the Customs and Border Patrol branch of DHS provides security for a reported 
328 land, air, and seaports.13  Other ports such as Long Beach and New York operate in 
similar manners.  As the port size begins to get smaller, so do the resources.  One can see 
from the official websites of the Oakland Port and Savannah Port that there is not a 
significant amount of information on the security agencies involved on site.  One report 
                                                     
11  Chapman, L., & OF THE, N. S. (2004, Jan 03). Maine on target with port security private sector ready for strict new 
rules. Bangor Daily News Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/414163135?accountid=7398\ 
12 Port of Los Angeles, City of Los Angeles. (2015, September 23). Retrieved from Port of Los Angeles: 
https://www.portoflosangeles.org/ 
13 US Department of Homeland Security. (2015, October 1). At Ports of Entry. Retrieved from US Customs and Border 
Patrol: http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry 
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details the increased spending on port security throughout the nation.14  These costs are 
on the rise because of technological advances.  
Current Actions Taken to Mitigate the Issues or Challenges: 
With the majority of business being handled by private organizations, the public 
sector must be concerned with regulations and policy to safeguard the port and the 
homeland.  When it comes to the security of U.S. ports and all transient cargo and 
personnel, the buck stops with DHS.  The DHS has the overall task of overseeing and 
ensuring port security by working with the other agencies and continuing to find ways to 
protect the United States.15  
As mentioned, one of, if not the greatest challenge for port security is countering 
the constant, ever-evolving threat.  This challenge, along with the several other 
challenges and issues mentioned have been frequently addressed by DHS and by other 
federal, state, and local port stakeholders (public and private sectors), through numerous 
programs and security initiatives.  The DHS has three primary agencies that have 
implemented the most significant programs. First, the USCG introduced regulations and 
programs that require ports, port related facilities, and port operators to address security 
issues within their individual entities.  The requirements entailed that the public and 
private sector actors must develop, introduce, and maintain individual organization 
security plans within their respective organization to identify and address their 
susceptibilities so to mitigate these issues.16  These individual assessments and security 
plans are required to be performed regularly to ensure that vulnerabilities are identified 
                                                     
14 Pate, A., Taylor, B., & Kubu, B. (2008). Protecting America’s Ports: Promising Practices. US Department of Justice. 
15 GAO-14-636T: Maritime security: Progress and challenges with selected port security programs before the 
committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S.Sen.1 (2014) (Testimony of Stephen Caldwell). 
Retrieved from http://wwwgao.gov/products/GAO-14-636T. 
16 GAO-14-636T 
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and address, as well as communicated cross-sector, to identify weaknesses and potential 
risks and mitigate against the threat.    
 A significant challenge remains, however, in the unavoidable dependence upon 
security efforts at foreign ports of origin. This requires diplomatic and DHS partnership 
with counterparts overseas.17  The CBP provides security in a layered approach, focused 
on identifying and/or mitigating potential threats to the port, more generally to the safety 
and security of the homeland.  The CBP does this by providing a presence at foreign 
ports and having foreign-based inspectors to inspect cargo that is US-bound.18  The CBP 
is also responsible for inspecting cargo arriving in the U.S.  Since the CBP is widespread 
and very active around the globe, it offers unique opportunities for them to develop 
partnerships and collaborate with foreign Custom agencies and private businesses around 
the globe to provide security to the global supply chain and security at home.  The CBP 
has accomplished this through two notable program, the first being the Container 
Security Initiative (CSI).  The CSI is an action taken by the CBP to establish a presence 
at various ports around the globe, to work with and develop partnerships within the trade  
community.19  This allows the CBP to gather intelligence and determine potential risks of 
cargo shipments before the shipment arrives in the US. The CSI program was initiated by 
the CBP to enable the capabilities for advance screening on cargo before it is loaded onto 
ships set for the US.20  The second significant program of the CBP that utilizes 
international partnerships with private sector organizations is the Customs-Trade 
                                                     
17 GAO-14-636T: Maritime security: Progress and challenges with selected port security programs before the 
committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S.Sen.1 (2014) (Testimony of Stephen Caldwell). 
Retrieved from http://wwwgao.gov/products/GAO-14-636T. 
18 RAND: Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy. (2006). Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy. 
Retrieved September 29, 2015, from RAND: 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG520.pdf 
19 Department of Homeland Security. (2015). U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Retrieved from 
http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ 
20 CT410: Securing America’s ports: Testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, U.S.Sen.1 (2014) (Testimony of Henry Willis). Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT410. 
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Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program.  The C-TPAT is a voluntary program 
enabling the CBP and the private sector companies to work in unison to provide security 
of the supply chain.21  The C-TPAT initiated by the CBP is geared towards securing the 
supply chain, while mitigating the impact of new security measures on free market 
trade.22 
The last primary Federal level agency is the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA). The TSA provides security measures in the form of surveillance 
systems and programs.23  Specifically, the TSA administers a credentialing system that 
heightens security in secure cargo areas. The system, coined as the Transportation 
Worker Identification Credentialing (TWIC), works by biometrically verifying personnel 
so that only authorized individuals gain access to maritime ports and areas within these 
ports.24  
Recommendations for Improving Best Practices: 
One of the key issues and struggles regarding port security is how to integrate and 
incorporate the private sector.  A project done by the Council of Foreign Relations aimed 
at determining issues between private and public sector securities of port infrastructures 
determined that the private sector was willing and able to play a larger role in providing 
security, but the federal government made it difficult for them to do so25.  Post 9/11 
reorganizations in the federal government was one of the difficulties along with lack of 
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committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S.Sen.1 (2014) (Testimony of Stephen Caldwell). 
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23 Port of Los Angeles, City of Los Angeles. (2015, September 23). Retrieved from Port of Los Angeles: 
https://www.portoflosangeles.org/ 
24 Sadler, S. (2013, June 18). Testimony on TSA's role in the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) 
program. Retrieved September 29, 2015, from Official website of the Department of Homeland Security: TSA: 
https://www.tsa.gov/news/testimony/2013/06/18/testimony-tsas-role-transportation-worker-identification-credential-
twic 
25 Flynn, S & Pricto, D. (2006, April 28). Capitalizing on the Private Sector to Protect the Homeland. Retrieved from 
http://www.cfr.org/border-and-port-security/capitalizing-private-sector-protect-homeland/p10560 
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information sharing to the private sector, lack of funding and lack of preparation for 
major disasters.   
One key thing to point out is to make sure that the CEO’s and other heads of 
private companies understand that the final say on how to protect ports and their 
infrastructure is the responsibility falls on the federal government which does not give 
that CEO the final say on how to go about protecting the port.  With that being said, it is 
also very important for the federal government to constantly evaluate and improve 
individual ports, not using general evaluations and counting on blanket recommendations 
to work for all ports when clearly all ports have their own special needs in regards to 
security and what they are protecting from and against.  It is imperative that there be an 
increase in information sharing between the private and public sector regarding pertinent 
safety bulletins.26 
The continuing concerns of stowaways, especially those coming from affected 
areas with issues like Ebola, is a major law enforcement concern that can be made easier 
and help lessen the burden by including the private sector in the screening process at 
foreign ports as well as clearing operations here at our ports.  This threat could end up 
being an issue that needs pushed up the chain up to and including the need for new 
legislation being introduced to flag ships coming from these areas.  
The public sector can also do a better job of working with the private sector when 
it comes to implanting security guards and protocols, starting with hiring processes all the 
way through offering employment and training as well as continuing education.   Another 
key factor to consider is following (and expanding into the private sector) the lead of the 
Jacksonville Port Authority (JAXPORT) in regards to implementing P25 compliant radio 
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systems that allow the port to communicate with local officers.  Allowing the private 
sector to access the P25 system would allow a better means of communication between 
everyone working at the port and allow for one standard way of radio communication and 
the ability for private sector security to immediately contact and communicate with the 
public sector in regards to the public safety radio system. 
Incorporating and allowing the private sector to assist with port security will add 
flexibility to what the ports are already doing to secure and protect from the main issues 
that they face; smuggling, human trafficking, drug trafficking or even acts of terrorism.  
Private investment is contributing significantly to modernization efforts for trans-loading 
cargo and port security as a whole. 
With the lack of funding that faces the public sector, incorporating the 
aforementioned ready and willing private sector is a must.  With that comes the demand 
for better communication between the government and both private and public port 
security.  Similar to the issues that were exposed after 9/11, many still feel today that 
interagency security is lacking when it comes to effectively managing and securing ports 
due to the differences facing federal authorities like the United States Coast Guard and 
local authorities.  Improving security within private sector ports focuses on cross-
governmental multi-agency collaboration that drives policy formulation and execution, 
and bringing all the players, federal, state, local and private, to the table to come together 
will benefit all parties involved in securing our ports. 
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 Situation: 
In a general sense, most private sector organizations identify criminal activity and security gaps 
within their respective organizations both by way of the risk management process and/or the security 
officials each has established/enlisted to protect their individual interests and assets. The methodology and 
system tends to vary from organization to organization in the private sector; however, nearly all private 
entities or organizations adhere to/have in place some form and varying degree of a systematic risk 
management process to provide protection and security to their business. Mostly private security 
professionals and/or security personnel within the individual organization run these risk management 
systems for each individual organization. The practices and methods used by each individual organization 
vary, as previously stated, but the duties fall on and the process itself is carried out in either one of two 
common ways or in some cases a combination of both – i.e., internal and/or external security personnel. 
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Internal security consists of selected or hired personnel from within an individual organization 
tasked specifically with running the risk management system and following through and implementing the 
security practices and protocols in place. External security usually consists of security professionals and/or 
private security firms hired or consulted to establish and/or operate the security system for an organization 
– i.e., third-party security professionals. As alluded, an organization’s security process is managed and 
operated either internally or externally, or in some cases the internal security management consults or 
outsources specific duties to a third-party external security source. 
Challenges and Issues: 
            The private sector’s risk management process is quite similar to that used in the public sector. The 
process is largely driven by crime analysis and= it is common practice for private organizations to 
implement and follow broad guidelines and protocols established by industry associations.1  The risk 
management security system is set up to mitigate, prevent, respond, and recover from any perceived, 
imminent, ongoing, or carried out threat or act. Thus, identifying criminal activity within the confines of the 
organization falls within the risk management process. The private sector does this by applying or during a 
standard or specific threat/risk assessment of its organization or its supply chain. This process is done by 
utilizing law enforcement data and/or by conducting and/or reviewing in-house security reports.2 By 
conducting a crime analysis, the organization uses data collected by law enforcement agencies – local,  
  
                                                          
1 Vellani, K. H. (2010). Crime analysis for problem solving security professionals in 25 small 
steps. Center for Problem-Oriented Policing. Retrieved from 
http://www.popcenter.org/library/reading/pdfs/crimeanalysis25steps.pdf 
2 Vellani, K. H. (2010). Crime analysis for problem solving security professionals in 25 small 
steps. Center for Problem-Oriented Policing. Retrieved from 
http://www.popcenter.org/library/reading/pdfs/crimeanalysis25steps.pdf  
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state, tribal, federal agencies – to identify and link common crime trends or methods of operations (MOs) of 
criminals in general or specific to the area or industry of the organization. 
By identifying these trends and MOs, an organization’s security management and personnel can 
zone in on specific threats to specific sections or assets of their organization or focus on specific 
vulnerabilities of their organization and/or supply chain. This enables the organization to identify areas at 
risk, look into those areas – whether they be in the security itself, employees or personnel most at risk to be 
taken advantage of, or assets criminals may target or utilize to carry out their crime – and either find 
security gaps within the confines of their organization or identify discrepancies or suspicious activity and 
determine if they are in fact actual criminal activities. Businesses in the United States have a long history of 
collaboration and cooperation with the public sector on security matters. However, until recently, legal 
restrictions prevented companies from influencing social affairs.3 With the removal of these restrictions in 
the 1950s, corporations began looking to “cultivate a broad view of their own self-interest while instinctively 
searching for ways to align self-interest with the larger good.”  
Businesses have strong economic incentive to contribute to homeland security programs to 
prevent criminal and/or terrorist disruptions to their operations and disaster response efforts to return to 
normal operations as expeditiously as possible post-incident.4 Through programs such as the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), the private sector is better able to integrate into the wider 
customs and border protection architecture. C-TPAT offers significant financial incentives for private sector  
                                                          
3 Smith, N. C. (1994). The New Corporate Philanthropy. Harvard Business Review (May-June), 
Pg. 106-116. 
4 Young, D. Y., & Burlingame, D. F. (1996). Paradigm Lost: Research toward a New 
Understanding of Corporate Philanthropy. In D. Y. Young, & D. F. 
Burlingame, Corporate Philanthropy at the Crossroads (pp. 158-176). Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press. 
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port industry cooperation such as reduced examination rates for importers, expedited border crossing 
privileges and ‘front of the line’ customs processing.5 Over 10,000 firms are certified through C-TPAT and 
work closely with United States Customs and Border Protection on port security issues. 
Technology plays an increasingly important role in the implementation of both private and non-
private port security. CCTV cameras and motion detectors have been used in ports for several decades.  
The port security industry has had to keep up with the shift towards the digital world.  Much of the advances 
have been done in the area of surveillance.  Large companies like Controp provide surveillance equipment 
such as High performance Stabilized Observation Payloads used for day and night surveillance on board: 
UAVs, helicopters, VTOLs, light aircraft, maritime boats, USVs, ground vehicles and UGVs.6  These 
advanced devices make it possible for a smaller staff, made up of employees who may or may not have 
formal law-enforcement training to provide adequate surveillance over the large areas which ports naturally 
entail.  Ports have also implemented technology driven security features involving radar sensors, sonar 
sensors, integrated GPS and GIS mapping systems, and electronic card readers for access control.  These 
advancements have become part of the framework which makes up port security, and relies on the 
relationship between private businesses, the ports, and the local, state, & federal law enforcement.  This 
inter-agency multi-dimensional approach to security has required the responsible entities to redesign and 
rewrite their standard operating procedures 
Recommendations and Best Practices: 
                                                          
5 U.S. Customs and Border Protection. (2014, January). C-TPAT Program Benefits: Reference 
Guide. Retrieved October 16, 2015, from Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism: 
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/C-
TPAT%20Program%20Benefits%20Guide.pdf 
6 Controp.com. (2015). from http://www.controp.com/category/company-profile/ Retrieved 16 
October 2015. 
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Identifying security gaps and responding effectively presents a complex challenge requiring a well-
coordinated whole-of-community effort. Many academic reviews and case studies suggest that private-
public port security collaboration has the potential to reduce security costs and improve the overall 
effectiveness of port security operations. A number of authors such as Sheffi insist on a joint collaboration 
of the private and the public sector, which can increase the supply chain security of all ports.7 Port security 
should extend to certain parameters in security namely: 
1. Neutralizing vulnerabilities for criminal activity within the port, 
2. Identifying and responding to safety issues, 
3. Minimizing the threat of terrorism, 
4. And sharing intelligence and investigative information with appropriate law enforcement 
agencies.8 
 
            Writers for The Journal of the NPS Center for the Homeland point out: “Public-private partnerships 
are a major issue of discussion in businesses and government agencies concerned with homeland 
security… America’s ports are vital hubs of economic activity.”9 The authors continue to identify pre-
existing programs such as the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism program (C-TPAT), the 
Transportation Worker Identification Credential program (TWIC), the Screening Partnership Program (SPP) 
in airports, and the many technologies and equipment made by the private sector to make the public 
sector’s job easier. 
 
                                                          
7 Sheffi, Y. (2001). Supply chain management under the threat of international terrorism. The 
International Journal of Logistics Management , 12(2), 1-11. 
8 Christopher, Kenneth. (2015). Port Security Management: Second Edition. Boca Raton: Taylor 
and Francis Group. 
9 Busch, N. E., & Givens, A. D. (2012). Private-Public Partnerships in Homeland Security: 
Opportunities and Challenges. Homeland Security Affairs , 8. 
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Marine terminal operators (MTO) are the private sector companies operating terminal facilities 
within ports under direction of the overall port authority line.10 The challenge for MTOs is to put into place 
effective security measures while maintaining efficient and cost effective port operations.  While no ports 
are exactly identical, many share certain vulnerability characteristics.  Due to the size of most ports, the 
inherent accessibility makes it difficult to apply effective security measures.  Additionally, the sheer amount 
of material being transported provides a ready avenue for the introduction of different types of threats.11 
Terminal operators are required to maintain security for the property leased from the port 
authority.12  The U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) set minimum requirements for 
marine terminal operators’ security programs.  Frittelli, describes the basic elements of the security 
programs and at the heart of these programs is the terminal operator’s security assessment and facility 
security plan. The plan requires operators to address gaps identified in the assessment, specify methods to 
restrict access to the terminal, identify methods to monitor terminal activities through security guards, alarm 
systems, water patrols, surveillance equipment and lighting, procedures for checking container seals, and 
                                                          
10 Frittelli, J. F., & Lake, J. E. (2006). Terminal Operators and Their Role in U.S. Port and 
Maritime Security. Washington DC: CRS Report for Congress. 
11 Hecker, J. Z. (2002, August 5). Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New 
Initiatives Successful. Retrieved November 26, 2015, from United States General 
Accounting Office. 
12 Frittelli, J. F., & Lake, J. E. (2006). Terminal Operators and Their Role in U.S. Port and 
Maritime Security. Washington DC: CRS Report for Congress. 
 
 
 
 
verifying that arriving trucks and workers have legitimate business at the facility. Terminal operators work 
closely with the CBP to provide for container movement necessary to facilitate their inspections. As part of      
7 
the security plan, the terminal operator must designate a Facility Security Officer (FSO) as the single point 
of contact for security and communications to the Coast Guard and CBP. The FSO is required to conduct 
on site security exercises, drills, and assessments to determine gaps within a private sector operator’s 
security program. These internal security assessments and drills are a key activity conducted by terminal 
operators to improve systems and procedures. Increasing the frequency and involving third-party security 
experts presents an opportunity to improve the process. 
The private sector terminal operator is responsible for not only its own labor force but also for a 
wide variety of transportation workers, contractors, visitors, and temporary workers that enter terminal 
property. Individuals entering the terminal must either be fully escorted are possess a Transportation 
Workers Identification Credential (TWIC). The TWIC prescreens individuals with a background check and 
identifies the individual with a photograph and biometric data, including fingerprints. The terminal operator 
is responsible for verifying the TWIC credentials for all unescorted individuals on terminal property. 
Terminal operators can improve the TWIC process by updating card reader technology used at terminal 
access points to verify credentials, biometric data (fingerprints) and match the individual with database 
records. This represents a significant security improvement over the practice of simple visual verification of 
the workers identification card. 
In order for port security to be enhanced in maritime ports by the private sector, more incentives 
and possibly even mandatory regulations passed by Congress to promote enrollment and compliance in 
programs such as these.  While programs like TWIC and C-TPAT help to form an understanding between 
the Federal government and private sector businesses, government must be weary of letting trust take the 
 
 
 
place of security.  Some of these programs allow for added trust to the point that cargo may not be checked 
as thoroughly from a trusted vendor. This should be done very lightly to ensure security is met, all the while  
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private sector organizations must conform to preparatory and operational measures to ensure the secure 
U.S. homeland. 
Ports throughout the United States operate with different levels of security, generally based on the 
size of their operations. Some ports use a combination of private sector security companies working 
alongside sworn officers of state and federal authorizations. Private sector security has grown substantially 
across the world to a point that private security officers out number public sector law enforcement by more 
than three to one.13 Private security has been able to adopt new technologies and techniques much faster 
than public departments.14 While private security is alluring due to realized cost savings, it does pose some 
issues. Private services do not have the same legal authority as sworn officers and may need to rely on 
local law enforcement to make an arrest. Private security companies must train employees on probable 
cause and proper evidence gathering to effectively detain individuals or groups. There can be a large gap 
in training between government agencies and the private industry. Working alongside or under a law 
enforcement agency can enhance the effectiveness of private security organizations. In 2011, private 
                                                          
13 Blackstone, E. A., & Hakim, S. (2013). Competition versus monopoly in the provision of 
police. Security Journal , 26 (2), 157-179. 
14 Blackstone, E. A., & Hakim, S. (2013). Competition versus monopoly in the provision of 
police. Security Journal , 26 (2), 157-179. 
 
 
 
security firm Allied Barton assisted a south Florida port with transitioning to a hybrid port security model 
from full law enforcement to a combination of contract security and law enforcement officers.15 The port  
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successfully reduced security costs while maintaining a high level of protection through collaboration 
amongst the local County Sheriff’s Office and the private security firm. The research urges ports to 
collaborate with reputable private security firms who maintain high levels of training and certification. This 
research suggests the Department of Homeland Security and the United States Coast Guard should 
investigate creating a standard training curriculum and level of certification for private security firms wishing 
to operate as hybrid security model or a fully privatized port security model. Additionally, according to a 
report by the U.S. Congressional Budget Office, “businesses would be inclined to spend less on security 
than might be appropriate for the nation as a whole if they faced losses from an attack that would be less 
than the overall losses for society.”16 To incentivize the private sector to increase security practices and 
spending, the Center for American Progress suggests government intervention and regulation. They 
suggest three options to engage and enforce increased security practices: impose standards requiring the 
private sector to meet a set of security standards; government can provide direct subsidies and/or 
                                                          
15 Allied Barton. (2015). AlliedBarton Collaborates with Sheriff's Office to Secure Port 
Together. Retrieved November 26, 2015, from Allied Barton: 
http://www.alliedbarton.com/Security-Resource-Center/Case-Studies/View-Case-
Study/ArticleId/286/AlliedBarton-Collaborates-with-Sheriff-s-Office-to-Secure-Port-
Together 
16 US Congressional Budget Office . (2004, December). Homeland Security and the Private 
Sector. Retrieved November 26, 2015, from US Congressional Budget Office: 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/60xx/doc6042/12-20-
homelandsecurity.pdf 
 
 
 
incentives to offset the costs of increased security measures; and establish market based measures 
enabling companies to more efficiently allocate resources.17 
10 
It is essential to ensure there is effective communication links between private port operators, 
private port security firms and the government security apparatus. Collective information and information 
exchange in times of emergency or terrorism related issues should be effective and succinct. The new 
changes in the National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) was designed by US government to “improve 
capabilities and effectiveness of the federal government in communicating information about terrorist 
threats to public, government agencies, first responders, airports and other transportation and private 
sectors.”18 Forming a database system that shares information with the private sector ports and 
government agencies is paramount. The database should be limited to a need-to-know only basis and 
should be also accessible by certain elected officials and verified private security employees within the 
system. In case of emergency situations, the database should be formatted in an orderly fashion to deal 
with information overload issues and provide specific contextual information. In addition, a national policy 
should be encouraged to improve links between both sectors. Furthermore, many ports rely on employee 
diligence and self-reporting of security issues. This method of security could be improved by implementing 
                                                          
17 Housman, R., & Olsom, T. (2005). New Strategies to Protect American: A Market-Based 
Approach to Private Sector Security. Retrieved November 27, 2015, from The Center for 
American Progress: https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/kf/FECREPORT.PDF 
18 Christopher, Kenneth. (2015). Port Security Management: Second Edition. Boca Raton: 
Taylor and Francis Group. 
 
 
 
incentive programs and protections for whistleblowers that report everything from security vulnerabilities 
to corporate fraud to theft.19 
                                                          
19 Busch, N. E., & Givens, A. D. (2012). Private-Public Partnerships in Homeland Security: 
Opportunities and Challenges. Homeland Security Affairs , 8 
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Situation 
 The 9/11 Commission estimated that the private sector owns and protects 85% of the 
nation’s infrastructure.1  The U.S. government recognizes the need to have the private sector 
engaged in port security procedures.  There is a wealth of knowledge, experience, and resources 
provided by the private sector, making their partnership with government at various levels 
invaluable when it comes to improving and enhancing port security procedures.   
Multiple initiatives have been implemented by port security agencies to incorporate the 
private sector in port security procedures.  “Public-private partnerships have been defined as 
collaboration between a public sector (government) entity and a private sector (for-profit) entity 
to achieve a specific goal or set of objectives.”2  These private sector entities are often able to 
help fulfill the security needs of public sector ports through less expensive and more effective 
                                                          
1 9/11 Commission. (2004). The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States, Official Government Edition. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing  
Office. 
2 Busch, Nathan E., and Austen D. Givens. (2012, October).  Public-Private Partnerships in Homeland Security: 
Opportunities and Challenges. The Journal of the NPS Center for Homeland Defense and Security. Retrieved from 
https://www.hsaj.org/articles/233  
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means.  “Where the public sector is hard pressed to effectively address the monumental task of 
protecting ports and the through movement of people and cargo, industrious private firms have 
stepped up, developing, testing, marketing and implementing new products and services that are 
helping transportation providers and ports, and all those concerned with their protection.”3 
Public-private partnership is essential to facilitate security to the homeland, and thus, is 
an integral part to maritime port operations.  History has taught the United States government 
that the emergency management cycle, homeland security, and even military/defense endeavors 
are reliant on the private sector in order to be successful.   A few of these historical events that 
have bridged the inevitable partnership are the Great Chicago Fire of 1871, the 1906 San 
Francisco Earthquake, World War II, the Cold War, 9/11/2001, Hurricane Katrina, and the 
Deepwater Horizon incident—just to name a few highlighting events.4  In the wake of these 
devastating events to the country, private organizations played a pivotal role in sustaining the 
government’s efforts—everything from citizens participating in civil defense and private military 
manufacturing, to charitable contributions in recovery, and to fishermen assisting in cleanup 
efforts.  All of these demonstrate the much needed cooperation the public sector must have with 
the private sector.  Inversely, in times past, and even more so today, the private sector relies on 
this partnership to protect their internal supply-chain and economic stability.  Without 
governmental safeguard, the market, as well as goods and services, can become targets for the 
enemy. 
Challenges and Issues 
                                                          
3 Musser, Lori. (2012, December 11). Strong Seaports- Teaming Up to Step Up Safety and Security. AAPA Seaports. 
4 Busch, N. E., & Givens, A. D. (2012, October). Public-Private Partnerships in Homeland Security: Opportunities 
and Challenges. Retrieved October 2015, 2015, from Homeland Security Affairs: https://www.hsaj.org/articles/233  
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A key point for security throughout U.S. ports is identifying gaps.  To identify gaps the 
organization must be continually performing security self-assessments.5  Unfortunately, this is 
not always done in every port throughout the nation.  Ports still pose a significant risk due to the 
sheer volume of cargo and individuals that pass through each and every day. 
So what is it that is contesting the U.S. ports?  What are the threats, challenges, and 
dangers posed to the U.S. through maritime port security breaches?  The primary entities in ports 
comprise personnel, goods, and funding.  The majority of goods are transported in containers 
which could be exploited not only by illegitimate good transporters, but also by hijacked vessels 
that appear to be friendly.  Stuart Flynn refers to this potential terrorist threat as a “Trojan Horse” 
vessel.6  The other threat is the personnel—the individuals securing ports as well as the business 
people and their laborers taking advantage of the economic opportunities that lie there.  
There are other more modern threats that have emerged with the advent of a steadily all-
time high national debt and contemporary logistics and operations relying heavily on the cyber 
realm.  The funding for port security has been deemed as “grossly underfunded” – being cited to 
having received lower funding over a six year period than funding for the Iraq war received over 
a 2 and a half hour span.7  The other contemporary concern is that of cyber security.  With 
cyberterrorism and cyberwarfare growing National Security concerns, it should be no surprise 
maritime ports are at risk here as well.  Compromise of maritime port cyber-prone elements 
                                                          
5 Harrison, E. (2011, January). Securing the Supply Chain. Inbound Logistics. Retrieved from 
http://www.inboundlogistics.com/cms/article/securing-the-supply-chain/  
6 Flynn, S. (n.d.). Port Technology Web site: Assessing and confronting the challenges of port security. Retrieved 
from Excerpt from Port Technology International's Edition 40: 
https://www.porttechnology.org/technical_papers/assessing_and_confronting_the_challenges_of_port_security/  
7 Flynn, S. (n.d.). Port Technology Web site: Assessing and confronting the challenges of port security. Retrieved 
from Excerpt from Port Technology International's Edition 40: 
https://www.porttechnology.org/technical_papers/assessing_and_confronting_the_challenges_of_port_security/  
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include control systems, vessel networks, tracking technology, and logics software.8  If any of 
these items are affected it could make vulnerable ports more prone to physical attacks; but it also 
could cause severe economic blows due to port operations being delayed and impacted. 
Current Actions Taken to Mitigate Challenges and Issues 
 At the federal level, there are several initiatives in place to gain private sector 
involvement in port security procedures.  The Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT) is “a government-business sector initiative that was created to enhance worldwide supply 
chain security.  Over 10,000 firms are certified through the C-TPAT program, meaning they 
enjoy close working relationships with United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP), are 
able to obtain government risk assessments of their supply chain, and can attend special 
government-sponsored supply chain security training sessions.”  It is programs such as C-TPAT 
that help to provide a broad administrative framework for public-private sector coordination.9 
Section 109 of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 required the Secretary 
of Transportation to “develop standards and curriculum to allow for the training and certification 
of maritime security professionals.”10  The responsibility for providing the curriculum was 
delegated to the United States Maritime Administration, who in turn utilized the U.S. Merchant 
Marine Academy to develop and deploy training programs.  According to MARAD, “The goal of 
this voluntary certification program is to promote high quality, uniform training of maritime 
                                                          
8 Walters, R. (2015, February 23). Issue Brief on Homeland Security: The U.S. Needs to Secure Maritime Ports by 
Securing Network Ports. Retrieved from The Heritage Foundation Web site: 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/02/the-us-needs-to-secure-maritime-ports-by-securing-network-ports  
 
9 Busch, Nathan E., and Austen D. Givens. (2012, October). Public-Private Partnerships in Homeland Security: 
Opportunities and Challenges. Homeland Security Affairs 8, Article 18. Retrieved from 
https://www.hsaj.org/articles/233  
10 United States Marine Administration. Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) Course Certification. (n.d.). 
United States Maritime Administration, United States Department of Transportation. Retrieved from 
http://www.marad.dot.gov/education/maritime-transportation-security-act-mtsa-course-certification/.  
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security professionals.”11  The curriculum includes six distinct courses, five of which have direct 
application for private sector port security personnel.  Courses are provided for specific 
personnel, including; the Company Security Officer, the Facility Security Officer, Vessel 
Personnel with Security Duties, and Facility Personnel with Security Duties.  The curriculum 
also includes an awareness level course in maritime security.  Over 17,000 maritime security 
personnel have attended one or more of the courses. 
The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program works to enhance 
private sector involvement in port security.  The TWIC program “pre-screens workers with 
unescorted access to sensitive areas of America’s ports to ensure they do not pose a security 
threat.”  This helps to further supply chain security and also pushes to achieve port security 
objectives.12  
 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)’s annual Port Security Grant 
Program (PGSP) is one such endeavor to incentivize the private sector when it comes to 
enhancing port security.  The PGSP is one of FEMA’s grant programs that directly supports 
maritime transportation infrastructure security activities.  On the PGSP webpage, FEMA notes: 
The vast majority of U.S. maritime critical infrastructure is owned and operated 
by state, local, and private sector maritime industry partners.  PSGP funds 
available to these entities are intended to improve port-wide maritime security 
risk management; enhance maritime domain awareness; support maritime security 
training and exercises; and to maintain or reestablish maritime security mitigation 
protocols that support port recovery and resiliency capabilities.  PSGP 
investments must address Coast Guard identified vulnerabilities in port security 
and support the prevention, detection, response, and/or recovery from attacks 
involving improvised explosive devices (IED) and other non-conventional 
                                                          
11 United States Maritime Administration. Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) Course Certification. 
(n.d.).  United States Maritime Administration, United States Department of Transportation. Retrieved from 
http://www.marad.dot.gov/education/maritime-transportation-security-act-mtsa-course-certification/.  
12 Busch, Nathan E., and Austen D. Givens. (2012, October). Public-Private Partnerships in Homeland Security: 
Opportunities and Challenges. Homeland Security Affairs 8, Article 18. Retrieved from 
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weapons.13 
 
 Eligible applicants to the PGSP are those who deal with the implementation of Area 
Maritime Security Plans (AMSP) and Facility Security Plans (FSP) among port authorities, 
facility operators, and state and local government agencies that are required to provide port 
security services.  This is done under the authority of the Maritime Transportation Security Act 
of 2002.14  By hosting such a program, FEMA is encouraging the private sector to get involved 
in port security procedures and incentivizing them to come up with innovative solutions to port 
security needs. 
Other initiatives, such as CBP’s Consolidation Appropriations Act, allow for the private 
sector to appropriate and essentially donate resources to the agency.15  This type of cooperation 
saves the public sector money and benefits the private agency through the building of trust, tax 
write offs, and by putting resources to good use.  Additionally, to aid in the incorporation of the 
private sector in port security, the U.S. Department of Justice launched “Operation 
Cooperation”—a national effort to increase collaboration between the private sector, particularly 
private security and state and local law enforcement agencies.16  As part of the operation, a 
guidelines document was created that focused on how the public and private sector could pool 
their resources to reduce crime and public disorder.   
                                                          
13 Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2015, July 28). Fiscal Year 2015 Port Security Grant Program. 
FEMA, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved from http://www.fema.gov/fiscal-year-2015-port-
security-grant-program  
14 Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2015, July 28). Fiscal Year 2015 Port Security Grant Program. 
FEMA, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved from http://www.fema.gov/fiscal-year-2015-port-
security-grant-program 
15 Department of Homeland Security. (n.d.). Public-Private Partnerships. Retrieved October 22, 2015, from DHS 
Web site: http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/resource-opt-strategy/public-private-partnerships 
16 U.S. Department of Justice. (2003). Engaging the Private Sector To Promote Homeland Security: Law 
Enforcement-Private Security Partnerships. U.S. Department of Justice. Retrieved from 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/210678.pdf  
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 It is easy to see the role of the federal government in coordination with the private sector 
regarding port security efforts, but “it is equally important for local authorities to play a part in 
any discussion on infrastructure protection and preparedness.”17  As the agencies on-site who 
possess local knowledge and relationships with key industry players, state and local agencies in 
port locations are an invaluable resource and contribute through various avenues.  One such 
means is through local Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSC), which seek “to enhance 
communication between port stakeholders within federal, state, and local agencies, and industry 
to address maritime security issues.”18  Membership in an AMSC can lead to state/local law 
enforcement officers and even members of the private sector being granted access to pertinent 
national security information—if relevant to their operations and the security of their port of 
concern—via the State, Local, and Industry Security Clearance Program.19  Local authorities can 
also coordinate with the private sector to apply for and tailor federal grant funds to meet the 
unique needs of their specific port of interest via the PSGP.20  Local port authorities may 
coordinate with industry representatives regarding private security patrols when limited 
government resources prohibit the manpower necessary to provide 24/7 physical security at the 
port.   
There are initiatives at the local and state level, but the primary coordination is linked at 
the federal level.  Ongoing partnerships such as the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory 
Council (CIPAC) help to foster a forum where both the public and private sector stakeholders 
                                                          
17 U.S. Government Printing Office. (2006, June 21). Department of Homeland Security Preparedness Grants: Risk 
Based or Guess Work? Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, 109 Congress, Second 
Session. Serial No. 109-86. Retrieved from: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg33785/html/CHRG-
109hhrg33785.htm 
18 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard. (2015). Area Maritime Security Committee. Retrieved 
from: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg544/amsc.asp 
19 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard. (2015). State Local and Industry Security Clearance 
Program (SLI). Retrieved from: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg544/sli.asp 
20 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2015). FY2015 Port Security 
Grant Program. Retrieved from: http://www.fema.gov/fiscal-year-2015-port-security-grant-program 
8 
 
can come together to discuss security and resilience.21  Councils such as CIPAC help to develop 
and implement initiatives such as TWIC and C-TPAT.  These councils are imperative to public-
private partnership to protect critical infrastructure, ports, and the nation as a whole. 
Recommended Improvements for Best Practices 
 The government has many incentives in place to incorporate the private sector in port 
security procedures.  Based on the research conducted, there are mainly federal initiatives and 
few local, state, and regional initiatives in place.  For port security to become more efficient and 
effective, all levels of government must get involved with the private sector in order for ports to 
be as safe and secure as possible.  Various branches of the federal government must consider 
how they can further partner with local and state governments and with the private sector. 
 The federal government compiled the following list of functional responsibilities via the 
Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan that the private sector may perform. 
• “Participate in various maritime industry stakeholder professional organizations and 
advisory committees such as the AMSCs.  
• Engage in exchange of information about recovery operations plans with other potentially 
affected private sector entities and the Federal Government to mitigate potential 
congestion at non-incident site ports following the diversion of vessel traffic.  
• Assist in the assessment of economic impact. 
• Assist in the identification of prevention and recovery resources and assets. 
• Provide resources to assist in security and safety activities, as appropriate. 
• Participate in pilot programs to test the effectiveness of the Federal Government to 
communicate security activities to the private sector. 
• Using existing information-sharing mechanisms such as the National Infrastructure 
Coordinating Center (NICC), AMSCs, Transportation Sector Coordinating Councils and 
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC), communicate situational and 
operational information as well as physical asset capabilities for mitigation management. 
                                                          
21 Department of Homeland Security. (2015, September 17). Critical Infrastructure Sector Partnerships. Retrieved 
October 22, 2015, from DHS website: http://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sector-partnerships 
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• In conjunction with Federal, state, local and Tribal authorities, assist in providing security 
for critical infrastructure and key resources.”22 
 
If the private sector works to perform these duties, they will undoubtedly contribute to a safer 
port security environment in the United States.  The federal government should continue to find 
ways to incentivize the private sector to perform these duties. 
Through the creation of innovative technologies, the private sector is working to meet 
certain unmet needs of the government when it comes to port security.  For example, the SAIC 
Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS) was created by a private sector business.  The 
VACIS is “a device that emits low-level radiation, providing a rapid view of cargo containers’ 
contents – not unlike an X-ray machine.  The VACIS permits government and private sector 
officials to quickly evaluate if a given container poses a threat.”23  The private sector is generally 
very innovative when it comes to creating new technologies.  Therefore, all levels of government 
should work to incentivize the private sector to create new technologies that will benefit port 
security. 
 The federal government should continue to fund the current programs in place; however, 
best practice recommends the use of evidence based practice to sustain or make appropriate 
changes to these programs.  Even with several of these important programs underway, there are 
issues with them that could be solved with evidence based practice.  Regarding FEMA’s PGSP: 
…in 2014 FEMA stated that it is unable—due to resource constraints—to 
annually measure reduced vulnerability attributed to enhanced PSGP-funded 
security measures. Meanwhile, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
and the Coast Guard have been administering a program requiring maritime 
                                                          
22 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2008, April). Small Vessel Security Strategy. U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security. Retrieved from http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/small-vessel-security-strategy.pdf 
23 Busch, Nathan E., and Austen D. Givens. (2012, October). Public-Private Partnerships in Homeland Security: 
Opportunities and Challenges. Homeland Security Affairs 8, Article 18. Retrieved from 
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workers to obtain a biometric identification card to gain access to certain 
facilities. However, in 2011, GAO recommended that DHS assess internal 
controls to identify actions needed to address, among other things, weaknesses 
governing enrollment and background checks. As of March 2014 this action had 
not been completed.24 
 
 There is a problem in the federal government of recognizing problems but not then 
following up and taking the appropriate steps to fix them.  Therefore, operating under best 
practice recommendations, it is advised that each branch conducting a said program allocates the 
resources necessary to track the results of their program and then use this data to sustain or make 
changes to the program.  Further assessment of the programs in place is absolutely necessary. 
 Some local and state officials involved in AMSCs have expressed concerned over limited 
government funding.  Many of these agencies have had to withdraw from AMSCs because they 
simply cannot afford the travel and other requirements of membership.  This is but one example 
of how a lack of funding can have a critical impact on the scope of those involved in port 
security.  These federal programs must be continually funded so that all players are able to 
“come to the table” and participate.   
 There have been several programs implemented to improve port security and improve 
public-private partnerships in port security.  However, there is assuredly room for great 
improvement.  In order to effectively manage the success of the programs the government 
implements, more assessments of the programs must be done.  There has been a great effort to 
improve port security through various programs and technologies, but the effectiveness of these 
programs and technologies has yet to be truly gauged.  Only when this is done will the 
government grasp what changes to make and how to improve their port security endeavors.    
                                                          
24 Caldwell, S. L. (2014, June 4). Maritime Security: Progress and Challenges with Selected Port Security 
Programs. United States Government Accountability Office. Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-
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Situation 
National security assessments in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks identified many 
shortcomings and vulnerabilities in U.S. security processes. Maritime port security emerged as 
one area that needed significant attention, new ideas, and more resources to bolster its defenses 
against criminal and terrorist threats, one aspect of efforts to make the U.S. a harder target for its 
enemies to penetrate. The complexity of the issue of port security has many contributing factors, 
including: shared responsibilities of port operation and oversight among the public and private 
sectors; difficulty ensuring security along the entire supply chain due to potentially lax security 
at foreign ports; and the sheer volume of cargo that transits U.S. ports. This study focuses 
primarily on the first of these factors, the need for private sector involvement in port security 
efforts. More specifically, the authors examine how Area Maritime Security Committees 
(AMSCs) and private sector entities’ internal procedures impact port security. The research 
sought to identify challenges faced in incorporating the private sector; actions taken to-date by 
both the public and private sectors toward improving private sector engagement; and best 
practices recommended to promote greater involvement of the private sector.  
2 
 
Although the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) ultimately has the lead when it comes to 
maritime port security in the United States, it is imperative to realize that port security is the 
responsibility not solely of the government, but also the private sector, which uses the ports to 
conduct billions of dollars in business each year at locations all along the nation’s coasts and 
waterways. In 2002, President George W. Bush signed into effect the Maritime Transportation 
Security Act (MTSA).  The MTSA established AMSCs “to provide a link for contingency 
planning, development, review, and update of Area Maritime Security Plans (AMSP), and to 
enhance communication between port stakeholders within federal, state and local agencies, and 
industry to address maritime security issues.”1   
 While AMSCs represent government attempts to blend public and private sector security 
efforts, private entities have their own individual internal standard operating procedures (SOPs) 
dealing with security.  The private sector is at the forefront of national security due to its physical 
and economic presence on our borders.  The public sector relies on the private sector/private 
industries to play a key role in not only the planning process, but also the recovery process when 
disaster strikes. The Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan (MIRP) makes note that the private 
sector plays an important part in planning, operations, and advisory aspects involving port 
infrastructures.2 As the private sector continues to grow in the midst of public sector budget 
constraints, its significance grows, as well. Therein lies the importance of enhancing the private 
sector’s engagement in AMSCs, as well as the strengthening and standardization of private 
sector SOPs. 
Challenges/Issues 
 
                                                     
1 U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2015). Area Maritime Security Committees 
(AMSC) Brochure. Retrieved from https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg544/docs/AMSC%20Brochure.pdf  
2 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2006, April). The Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan. Retrieved 
from www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/HSPD_MIRPPlan_0.pdf 
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           Despite the establishment of dozens of AMSCs throughout the country, attracting private 
sector members and maintaining consistent and active participation have proven difficult. Since 
it is a federal program, the pertinent federal law enforcement agencies can be required to attend. 
Even state, local, or tribal agencies, as part of the public sector, typically are more compelled to 
attend and participate. The private sector, however, does not have to make AMSC participation a 
priority, and companies are less likely to participate if doing so is viewed as a hindrance to 
efficiency and profitability. In 2013, the USCG cited “a decline in support and participation by 
industry partners in AMSC meetings” for reasons including “increased responsibilities of 
AMSCs, budget pressure, and the long distances some members must travel for committee 
meetings.”3 If private sector port security personnel, as potential and desired AMSC members, 
do not see AMSC participation as a contributor to their respective companies’ success, then 
attendance is unlikely to improve.  
Another challenge to private sector integration into AMSCs, specifically, and port 
security, in general, has been the sharing of sensitive intelligence information. Typically, such 
information is limited to security and/or intelligence personnel with federal security clearances, 
or potentially certain members of the non-federal law enforcement community. The private 
sector cannot be expected to contribute to improving the security environment at our nation’s 
ports if they lack critical information on threats and vulnerabilities that would enable them to do 
so. As the 9/11 Commission Report noted, the challenge for the intelligence community is 
finding ways to better support public-private security groups without risking legitimate national 
secrets.  
The aforementioned challenges fall mostly on the shoulders of the public sector, and the 
private sector also faces its own issues when it comes to incorporating security to the level the 
                                                     
3 USCG, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2013, December 20). Area Maritime Security Committees: 
Challenges, Accomplishments, and Best Practices Annual Report. Retrieved November 5, 2015, from US Coast 
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government would prefer. The root cause of these issues typically can be traced to a lack of 
funding and/or material resources, along with a lack of standardization. Most successful private 
sector firms operating in the maritime port industry have their own security programs, which can 
incorporate various security measures from uniforms and physical access restrictions to cyber 
threats and employee health and safety. These internal SOPs can and do vary from one company 
to another, however, thereby presenting an opportunity for gaps in the overall security of 
maritime ports.  
Actions Taken 
 
As previously discussed, the need for private sector engagement in the realm of maritime 
port security was one of many shortcomings identified during the detailed scrutiny of U.S. 
national and homeland security in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks. Accordingly, 
efforts have been made through various initiatives to increase private sector involvement in port 
security. Some of these efforts are the result of legal requirements, such as Presidential Policy 
Directive-214 regarding critical infrastructure security and Executive Order 136365 specifically 
governing cybersecurity, which “require federal agencies to collaborate with their respective 
industry sectors” to identify vulnerabilities to critical infrastructure.6 Some of the actions taken 
to-date towards increasing private sector engagement are highlighted below. 
One of the most significant attempts to bring together members of both the government 
and private sector with a shared stake in port security was the creation of the AMSC. Run by the 
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), each AMSC is 
composed of at least seven members, all of whom may be selected from various organizations 
                                                     
4 The White House Office of the Press Secretary (2013, February12). Presidential Policy Directive-21: Critical 
Infrastructure Security and Resilience. Retrieved from: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil  
5 National Archives and Records Administration (2013, February 19). Executive Order 13636 Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity. Retrieved from: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-02-19/pdf/2013-03915.pdf  
6 USCG, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2013, December 20). Area Maritime Security Committees: 
Challenges, Accomplishments, and Best Practices Annual Report. Retrieved November 5, 2015, from US Coast 
Guard: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg544/docs/AMSC%20Report%2020DEC13.pdf 
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and agencies, public and private, with legitimate interest in security operations at the given port.  
At least seven of these members must have at least five years’ experience in the field of 
maritime/port security operations.  AMSCs are responsible for identifying critical port 
infrastructure and operations; identifying risks; determining mitigation strategies and 
implementation methods; developing and describing the process to continually evaluate overall 
port security; and providing advice to, and assisting the Captain of the Port (COTP) – the Coast 
Guard officer responsible for the port – in developing the AMS Plan.7 
While AMSCs provide the forum in which the public and private sectors can interact and 
collaborate on port security, additional measures have been taken to facilitate communication 
and the flow of sensitive information. In order to minimize the need to sanitize certain security-
related intelligence products for dissemination to AMSC members not normally privy to such 
information, they have the opportunity to be granted a limited scope security clearance through 
the State, Local, and Industry (SLI) Program. Non-federal AMSC members, whether government 
or civilian, may request the clearance via the COTP and must undergo the same background 
investigation process as the federal members in order to obtain the clearance. This willingness to 
take the necessary steps to share pertinent security information is an important step on the part of 
the federal government. 
Additionally, the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), administered 
federally by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), conducts security screenings of 
all employees with port access, to include those of the private sector.8 With this program the 
federal government emphasizes the importance of screening all port employees while 
shouldering some of the workload to do so. The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism 
(C-TPAT), administered by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), is another example of a 
                                                     
7 USCG, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2015). Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSC) Brochure. 
Retrieved from https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg544/docs/AMSC%20Brochure.pdf 
8 Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2015). Transportation Worker 
Identification Credential (TWIC). Retrieved from: https://www.tsa.gov/for-industry/twic 
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government program in which participants from the private sector fulfill certain security 
requirements in exchange for various benefits in streamlining the customs inspection/clearance 
process.9 Private sector entities also can utilize free government resources via the America’s 
Waterway Watch (AWW) program to educate their employees on how/when to report suspicious 
activity.10 All of these government programs are available to the private sector, and information 
regarding their potential benefits to private sector participants can be better disseminated through 
the forum provided by AMSCs.  
While organizations within the private sector may tailor their individual security 
programs to their specific niche, they do not have to rely upon developing their own processes 
from scratch. There are frameworks in place to facilitate efficiency and interoperability among 
legitimate parties to ensure everyone is speaking the same language. These include various U.S. 
government programs, as well as standards established by the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO)11 and the World Customs Organization (WCO).12 
Recommendations/Best Practices 
Ports are fundamentally vulnerable to terrorist attacks and criminal activity due to their 
sheer size and the multifarious nature of the many varied port environments that exist throughout 
the U.S. and the world. AMSCs are vital links among all parties with a stake in U.S. port security 
and, as such, private sector participation should be encouraged and actively sought by 
participating government representatives. AMSCs provide an effective and efficient means for 
regular, open communication and information sharing among the various port security actors 
from both the public and the private sectors. The committees promote a collaborative 
                                                     
9 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2015). Customs and Trade 
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). Retrieved from: http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/cargo-
security/c-tpat-customs-trade-partnership-against-terrorism  
10 USCG (2015). America’s Waterway Watch. Retrieved from: 
http://americaswaterwaywatch.uscg.mil/What_Else_Should_I_Do.html 
11 International Organization for Standardization (2015). About Us. Retrieved from: 
http://www.iso.org/iso/home.htm  
12 World Customs Organization (2015). About Us: WCO Goals. Retrieved from: http://www.wcoomd.org/en/about-
us/what-is-the-wco/goals.aspx  
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environment in which all interested parties contribute to update and improve port security plans 
and procedures, thereby helping to secure U.S. critical infrastructure in a broader context. 
Engaging with the AMSCs provides private industry actors with invaluable information from a 
variety of different perspectives, giving them a comprehensive awareness and working 
understanding of the complex dynamics of the security issues throughout the port. This sharing 
of information was the most critical missing component of U.S. security failures that led up to 
the 9/11 attacks.13 To enable a cultural shift from ‘need to know’ to ‘need to share’, the 
intelligence community must consider ways to better integrate with private sector partners.14 
AMSCs directly address the issue of interagency communication for the sake of critical 
infrastructure security and, accordingly, should be treated seriously and promoted aggressively.  
At a minimum, the COTP or his/her designee should seek to recruit private sector 
security officials at a given port to participate actively in the AMSC. If the federal government is 
serious in its belief in the incalculable value of the private sector when it comes to port security, 
and if private sector AMSC participation continues to wane, the government could also consider 
mandating participation for private commercial enterprises that wish to conduct business in a 
port. The key in selling such a requirement is to emphasize the extensive benefits that 
accompany AMSC participation, namely access to critical information that facilitates safe and 
secure operation for all parties in the port, in exchange for relatively little resource expenditure 
by the private parties involved. Issues such as the time and travel distance required of some 
private sector AMSC participants have been cited as reasons for a decline in participation. The 
COTP should take actions to facilitate ease of participation in such cases, such as permitting 
                                                     
13 9/11 Commission. (2004, July 22). The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on 
the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Executive Summary. Retrieved November 8, 2015, from 9/11 
Commission: http://www.911commission.gov/report/911Report_Exec.pdf 
14 USCG, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2013, December 20). Area Maritime Security Committees: 
Challenges, Accomplishments, and Best Practices Annual Report. Retrieved November 5, 2015, from US Coast 
Guard: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg544/docs/AMSC%20Report%2020DEC13.pdf 
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meetings, or even seminar type exercises, via secure video teleconference.15 Efficient and 
productive AMSC meetings and exercises are crucial to valuing members’ time.   
Participation in AMSCs could also increase private sector awareness of other government 
port security programs that seek to involve the private sector. The federal government should 
ensure frequent, targeted dissemination of information to the private sector regarding programs 
such as SLI, TWIC, AWW, C-TPAT, etc. in order to enhance awareness of their availability and 
utility. AMSCs can provide a perfect avenue through which to ensure such information finds its 
way to its intended audience. Participation in such programs should, then, be incorporated into 
private sector internal SOPs. The government should encourage incorporation of such pertinent 
security practices at a foundational level in order to promote standardization, helping to close 
security gaps in the global supply chain and ease management of port security as a whole.  
Actors within the private sector, in-turn, must make significant efforts to participate in 
the port security process. Engaging with the AMSC provides the opportunity to regularly weigh 
in and express concerns from the private sector/industry perspective. In AMSCs, the private 
sector members are regarded and operate as equal partners, and the information and input on 
their security concerns assist the USCG in their operations, planning, and production of port 
security procedures. AMSCs across the nation provide private sector stakeholders a partnering 
role in informing the decision making process, rather than just lending information or services as 
requested. Therefore, the private sector should regularly engage with the AMSC and influence 
the revision of port security procedures and protocols to better represent the private sector 
perspective. 
 Private partners in the port industry should also maintain their own robust internal 
security procedures, consistent both with the needs of individual company along with the public 
                                                     
15 USCG, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2013, December 20). Area Maritime Security Committees: 
Challenges, Accomplishments, and Best Practices Annual Report. Retrieved November 5, 2015, from US Coast 
Guard: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg544/docs/AMSC%20Report%2020DEC13.pdf 
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sector’s overall goals for infrastructure security. The private sector can do so by investing 
resources into their own security, while simultaneously making use of the many security 
programs and free resources made available by the government. Local authorities can also 
coordinate with the private sector to apply for and tailor federal grant funds to meet the unique 
needs of their specific port of interest via the Port Security Grant Program.16 
Furthermore, private sector companies involved in port security should develop, write, and 
update their port facility security plan (FSP) as part of their SOPs in order to mitigate identified 
risks.     
Many port organizations already have internal security procedures that should be 
universal. Some of these include: uniforms treated as controlled/accountable items; 
security/access badges, with varying levels of access depending on one’s duties; audio/video 
monitoring and recording; hiring guards or contracting for physical security patrols; and cyber 
threat analysis. The latter, cyber threats, requires significant attention in today’s increasingly 
digitally dependent world. Maritime ports are no different from most modern industries in their 
heavy reliance on technology, both on ship and on shore, so cyber risks can be very complex and 
jeopardize the safety and security of port operations.17 In the end, private sector port security 
partners need to make sure security is a fundamental part of their SOPs, as “the development and 
use of SOPs are an integral part of a successful quality system, as it provides individuals with the 
information to perform a job properly and facilitates consistency in the quality and integrity of a 
product or end-result.”18 
                                                     
16 Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2015). FY2015 Port Security 
Grant Program. Retrieved from: http://www.fema.gov/fiscal-year-2015-port-security-grant-program 
17 Thomas, P. (2015, October 8). Cyber Risks and the Marine Transportation System. Retrieved November 4, 2015, 
from www.dhs.gov: http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/10/08/written-testimony-uscg-house-homeland-security-
subcommittee-border-and-maritime 
18 Kenneth, Christopher. (2015). Port Security Management, Second Edition. Taylor & Francis Group: Boca Raton, 
FL. Retrieved from https://books.google.com/books?id=D-
jMAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA225&lpg=PA225&dq=private+sector+port+security+standard+operating+procedures&sour
ce=bl&ots=KYg1pcRJUb&sig=59ockjmMKV-
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 AMSCs involve all levels of government and any industry partners to work together and 
build upon and maintain maritime security. Unity of effort to combat any security threat and 
cooperating with others to ensure proper security is imperative.19 Any organization involved in 
the maritime industry should choose to participate in the AMSCs to enable information 
dissemination and to take advantage of training opportunities regarding new threats or security 
procedures. The resources and knowledge of the private sector can be of great value to the U.S. 
government, and vice versa, as all parties seek to make ports more resilient. Ultimately, 
communication is the most important practice identified relating to increasing private sector 
participation in AMSCs and incorporation of enhanced security measures into private 
organization SOPs. Information needs to be shared in both directions. The government needs to 
incentivize the programs it already has to make them appealing to companies focused on their 
bottom line. And private companies with a stake in U.S. port operations need to take 
responsibility to contribute to and facilitate a collaborative and efficient security environment. 
All of these actions must occur not only to protect the integrity of the portion of the U.S. 
commercial supply chain that transits the nation’s maritime ports, but to promote U.S. national 
security.   
                                                                                                                                                                           
EtBCjm4cbAFP23PA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAGoVChMIrvnd-
Yn4yAIVSEGICh0dDAfj#v=onepage&q=standard%20operating%20procedure&f=false  
19 Thomas, P. (2015, October 8). Cyber Risks and the Marine Transportation System. Retrieved November 4, 2015, 
from www.dhs.gov: http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/10/08/written-testimony-uscg-house-homeland-security-
subcommittee-border-and-maritime 
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Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis 
This case study exams selected Asian ports with focus on the history of port development, port 
management and operation, and advancements in security measures and practices. 
Recommendations are proposed for improving U.S. security, based on ports studied in the 
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysian, and Indonesia. For each port, the Situation, Challenges and 
Issues, and Current Actions to Mitigate Challenges and Issues are reviewed. The case study 
concludes with Recommended Improvements for Best Practices. 
Philippines – Situation 
 In the 1970s, before the creation of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), there were 591 
national and municipal ports plus 200 private ports throughout the Philippines. The need for 
long-range planning and rationalization of port development became apparent. The Filipino 
government created the Philippine Ports Authority under Presidential Decree No. 505, with later 
amendments, which “broadened the scope and functions of the PPA.” In 1978, Presidential 
Executive Order No. 513 granted police authority to the PPA and created a National Ports 
Advisory Council to strengthen cooperation between the government and private sector. The 
PPA is now attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications for policy and 
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program coordination.1 The PPA is responsible for management, operations, and finance of all 
public ports in the Philippines, with the exception of Port Cebu. 
Philippines – Challenges and Issues 
The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code was implemented by ports 
under PPA jurisdiction. Per the 2013 PPA Annual Report, the ISPS Code “has been an essential 
part of the Authority’s general security policies designed to establish an international framework 
involving Governments, Port Authorities, and Shipping and Port Industries to detect security 
threats and undertake preventive measures against security incidents affecting ships or port 
facilities used in international trade.” Specific to the ISPS Code, a study was conducted to 
discover compliance of major Filipino ports to requirements of the Code and level of knowledge 
and awareness of port personnel in the proper implementation, compliance, and evaluation of the 
Code. The safety and security of these ports, and others worldwide, largely depends on 
management of the port authorities in conjunction with the ISPS Code. The PPA has since taken 
steps to familiarize all personnel and key stakeholders on the concepts and principles of maritime 
and port security. 
Philippines – Current Actions to Mitigate Challenges and Issues 
In 2004, Port Management Officers in the Philippines submitted revised Port Facility 
Security Plans in accordance with the ISPS Code. Since then, the study has determined all 
Filipino ports are ISPS Code compliant. In fact, “the port authorities are strictly implementing 
the provisions and are also taking all necessary precautions in order not to repeat the experiences 
                                                          
1 Philippine Ports Authority (2015). About Us – History. Philippine Ports Authority. Retrieved from 
http://www.ppa.com.ph/ 
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of September 11, 2001.”2 The work being undertaken by Filipino ports helps ensure global 
security, with undoubted impact upon the U.S. Additionally, the PPA operates a Vessel Traffic 
Management System (VTMS), whose Control Center is a “state-of-the-art vessel monitoring 
facility managed and operated by PPA on a 24/7 basis. The operation of VTMS focuses on 
giving round-the-clock assistance as well as relaying information to pertinent government 
agencies incidents of vessel distress, accidents, piracy, and others for appropriate action.”3 Since 
implementation, the VTMS has served as both an effective navigational tracking tool and has 
increased security measures at the three major ports where installed. 
The Philippine government partners with the U.S. to improve port security. For example, 
in 2011, the U.S. government contributed over $26 million for upgrading of radiation detection 
capabilities in Asian Terminal Incorporated’s South Harbor and the International Container 
Terminal Services, Inc.’s Manila International Container Terminal. The governments hope the 
upgrades will prevent movement of radioactive or nuclear material through Philippine ports, and 
therefore prevent terrorist activity involving such materials.4 
Vietnam – Situation Vietnam is quickly becoming a global leader in exporting.  In 2014, 
Vietnamese container ports experienced the largest growth rate in the world5. Vietnam has a total 
                                                          
2 Weintrit, A. and Neumann, T. (2013). Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation: Maritime Transport  
and Shipping. Pages 133-137. CRC Press. Retrieved from https://books.google.com/books?id=Ax8l- 
UkmsEkC&pg=PA136&lpg=PA136&dq=top+three+ports+in+the+philippines&source=bl&ots=Disx2egyNM&sig=
z1_GaEVZlz_XPsgnRe8XKRlJP0A&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CDgQ6AEwBWoVChMIztyT6MGJyQIVRNgeCh1O2w
In#v=onepage&q=top%20three%20ports%20in%20the%20philippines&f=false. 
3 Monitoring and Evaluation Division, Strategic Planning Department. (2014). 2013 Annual Report. Philippines  
Ports Authority. Retrieved from http://www.ppa.com.ph/AnnualReport/Final%20PPA%20AR%202013.pdf 
4 Embassy of The United States. (2011, September 13). Philippines and U.S. Commission Megaports System to 
Increase Security at the Port of Manila. Retrieved from http://manila.usembassy.gov/megaports.html 
5 Too Many Vietnam Seaports Spoiling Terminal Business, Bloomberg News (March 18,2014) Retrieved From: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-03-14/too-many-vietnam-seaports-spoiling-terminal-business 
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of 114 seaports, with 14 key to economic development due to their size6. The remaining 100 are 
small and have poor supporting services and facilities. The three largest ports in Vietnam include 
the Saigon port, the Hai Phong port, and the Da Nang port.7 
Vietnam – Challenges and Issues 
While Vietnam has robust export numbers, the fact that many nearby nations have 
developed better seaports and shipping options cannot be overlooked. Most of the challenges 
faced by Vietnam’s seaports can be traced back to a lack of progress in building and growing 
their sea ports. Simply put, most of Vietnam’s neighbors have had more time to grow their sea 
port and exporting industries. One of the major challenges faced in Vietnam is overall 
connectivity. Sea ports must have reliable transportation infrastructure; highways, railways and 
connecting roads in between. Vietnam also lacks an overall sea port plan and some of their sea 
ports are not developed and planned properly for future cargo. Vietnam has a tax and fee 
collection system that makes it more difficult for cargo freighters to operate. Another key issue 
faced by seaports in Vietnam is the decentralized nature of government in the country. The 
provinces have a great deal of political power according Nguyen Xuan Thanh a Harvard’s 
Kennedy School of government representative in Vietnam.8 
Vietnam – Current Actions to Mitigate Challenges and Issues 
Vietnam is a key location, with nearly 2,000 miles of coast in the Gulf of Tonkin and the 
South China Sea. The nation is actively working to improve their sea ports, and Vietnam does 
                                                          
6 Runckel, C. W. (2006). Ports in Vietnam stunting amid economic development. Retrieved from Business in Asia: 
http://www.business-in-asia.com/ports_in_vietnam.html 
7 Runckel, C. (n.d.). Seaports in Vietnam. Retrieved November 10, 2015, from http://www.business-in-
asia.com/ports_in_vietnam.html 
8 Laursen, W. (2015, May 20). Vietnamese Container Ports Top 2014 Growth. Retrieved from The Marine 
Executive : http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/vietnamese-container-ports-top-2014-growth 
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have advantages in the region, including an abundance of low wage workforces and people 
willing to work. These advantages will continue to drive investments. Vietnam also finds itself in 
a pitched competition with nearby nations. The hotly contested Spratly islands show the 
importance of this region’s exporting industry. As this importance is realized by the Vietnamese 
government, there has been a concerted effort to expand the nation’s port capabilities. In a 2014 
article in the Bloomberg News there was concern by the director of the CIA Mep international 
terminal near Ho Chi Minh City that the government was pushing to increase the number of 
seaports in the country. The fear is that an over saturation of ports would lead to corruption.9 
The Vietnam government has been increasingly active and forthright in its plans to 
increase, expand, and improve their port systems in the country. The government has set forth 
admirable goals and intricate plans for how to achieve these goals. The process for which these 
goals and plans are carried out in Vietnam are based on decentralization policies which distribute 
the power, influence, roles and responsibilities throughout the Vietnamese government. As such, 
in the case of port initiatives and decision making the process initially begins with the highest 
level of the Vietnam Government, but then, passed down to Provinces for implementation. 
Districts or commune level government officials actually carry out implementing the initiatives 
in their areas that are affected by them. Therefore, the decentralized government/policies 
involves all levels of implementation.10  
Malaysia – Situation Malaysia’s Port Klang, the country’s largest port and gateway to the 
capital of Kuala Lumpur, consistently ranks among the world’s busiest maritime ports, with 
                                                          
9 Too Many Vietnam Seaports Spoiling Terminal Business, Bloomberg News (March 18,2014) Retrieved From: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-03-14/too-many-vietnam-seaports-spoiling-terminal-business 
10 de Wit, J.W, Viet Sang, L, Van Chien, L, Thu Hien, L, Viet Hung, H, Thi Anh Tuyet, D, … Thi Thanh Tam, M. 
(2012).Assessing decentralised policy implementation in Vietnam : The case of land recovery and resettlement in 
the Vung Ang Economic Zone (No. 546). ISS Working Paper Series / General Series (Vol. 546, pp. 1–55). Erasmus 
University Rotterdam. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/32910 
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throughput of nearly 11 million TEU in 2014.11 The three ports that comprise Port Klang – 
Northport, Southport, and Westport are administered by private corporate entities, yet they are 
responsible to the regulation of the local Port Klang Authority (PKA). The PKA, subsequently, 
reports to the national level Royal Malaysian Customs Department.12  
Malaysia – Challenges and Issues 
The narrow, 550-mile waterway straddling Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore is a key 
commercial maritime route carrying a third of the world's trade and half of the world's oil 
supply. The port serves as origin, destination, and transit point for passenger, shipping, and 
military vessels from all over the world and, therefore, also represents a significant target for 
would-be criminal or terrorist activity. As such, security of the supply chain at Port Klang is of 
particular interest to the United States. Some of the security practices employed at Port Klang 
also can be seen at many U.S. ports, or should be implemented if not currently in place. 
Malaysia – Current Actions to Mitigate Challenges and Issues 
Port Klang was an early partner with U.S. Customs and Border Protection in its Container 
Security Initiative implemented in the wake of the 9/11. CBP deploys personnel to ports around 
the world to partner with host nation customs officials in an effort “to target and prescreen 
containers and to develop additional investigative leads related to the terrorist threat to cargo 
destined to the United States."13 Port Klang subscribes to recommendations from the World 
Customs Organization on how major ports can facilitate security of the global supply chain.14 
During a summit in 2005, WCO personnel highlighted Port Klang’s extensive coordination 
among all parties with interest in port operations, from both the government and private sector, 
                                                          
11 Port Klang Authority (2015, November 11). Retrieved from: http://www.pka.gov.my/ 
12 Royal Malaysian Customs Department (2015, November 11). Retrieved from: http://www.customs.gov.my/en 
13 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (2015, November 11). Container Security Initiative. Retrieved from: 
http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/cargo-security/csi/csi-brief 
14 World Customs Organization (2015, November 11). Security Programme. Retrieved from: 
http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/enforcement-and-
compliance/~/link.aspx?_id=CC42F6A5A9B340109FF1ABB96BE5EC41&_z=z 
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as critical to the security effort. They also noted the importance of effective human resource 
development, focusing not only on hiring the right employees to bring in more revenue, but also 
“to embrace a wider range of functions including protection of the community, economic 
development, and national security.”15 Given its location along strategic trade routes and 
proximity to multiple Asian powers, Malaysia occasionally coordinates military exercises and 
operations with other nations in the region.16 These efforts deal extensively with maritime piracy 
issues, as many vessels that transit through Port Klang have been targets of pirates.17 Westport 
has been recognized as both safe and secure on an international level. The adoption of smart card 
and EDI technology has been a huge asset in security access measures to the port. This has 
reduced lost containers and container theft from the port provided cargo owners extra assurance 
of safety.18 The Northport section reports utilizing 24/7 video surveillance of all entry and exit 
points, roving physical security, and a 24/7 on-call emergency response team. The presence of 
the Port Klang Free Zone, essentially a duty free zone for shipping and manufacturing that is 
physically located at the port, yet technically outside of Malaysia to provide certain economic 
incentives for participants, should require even more deliberate scrutiny to ensure security 
measures are not circumvented.19 Razali and Dahalan20 conclude that implementation of the ISPS 
Code in the federal Malaysian ports has had positive implications for port and ship security and 
                                                          
15 World Customs Organization (2005, March 31). WCO Initiatives Enhance Security and Facilitation Measures at 
Port Klang in Malaysia. Retrieved from: http://www.wcoomd.org/en/media/newsroom/2005/april/wco-initiatives-
enhance-security-and-facilitation-measures-at-port-klang-in-malaysia.aspx 
16 Want China Times (2015, September 17). China and Malaysia Hold Naval Exercise in Strait of Malacca. 
Retrieved from: http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-
cnt.aspx?id=20150917000176&cid=1101&MainCatID=11 
17 Rider, David. (2015, February 17). Maritime Security Review. “ReCAAP Reports on Hijacking, IED.” Retrieved 
from: http://www.marsecreview.com/2015/02/recaap-reports-on-hijacking-ied/ 
18 Smart card & EDI. (n.d.). Retrieved November 11, 2015, from Our Port: 
http://www.westportsmalaysia.com/Technology-@-Smart_Card_-%E2%97%98-_EDI.aspx 
19 Port Klang Free Zone (2015, November 11). PKFZ Profile. Retrieved from www.pkfz.com 
20 Razali, N.H., Dahalan, W.S. (2012). The ISPS Code and It’s Implementation in Malaysia. Arena Hukam, 6, 42-47. 
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has reduced their vulnerability to terrorist attacks.  Improvements have been realized in the 
following areas; the level of physical and procedural security of ships and port facilities has been 
enhanced, good relationships have been developed between the Ministry of Transport and 
Security Officers, which improves cooperation in detecting and deterring security threats, and the 
training and heightened awareness of security has promoted good relations between shipping 
lines and port operations.    
Indonesia – Situation 
 Indonesia is a large spread out region, made up of over 17,000 islands. Like many of the 
islands, the respective ports vary greatly in size with approximately 154 active ports. As such, 
Indonesia is dependent on ports for the majority of its domestic transportation and international 
trade.21  A seaport may be hundreds of miles closer than other transportation options. In 2009, 
Indonesia moved 968 million tons of cargo through its ports.  
The majority of ports are managed by the Indonesia Port Corporation, a state-owned 
government enterprise.22 Indonesia has four state owned port operators, which are known as 
Pelindos I, II, III, and IV.23  The state-owned enterprises history dates back to the 1960’s when 
the government established Perusahaan Negara Pelabuhan, eight state-owned enterprises.  
Throughout the years there have been many changes to how ports are controlled. From the 60’s 
trough the 90’s, Perusahaan Umum (Perum) was established to go from individual companies to 
a single public corporation. 
Indonesia – Challenges and Issues 
                                                          
21 OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform: Indonesia. (2012, September 1). Retrieved December 2, 2015, from 
http://www.oecd.org/indonesia/Chap 5 - Ports Rail and Shipping.pdf 
22 Pelabuhan Indonesia II (SOE). (n.d.). Retrieved December 2, 2015, from http://www.indonesia-
investments.com/business/indonesian-companies/pelabuhan-indonesia-ii/item337 
23 Dodd, C. (2015, February 28). Indonesia launches massive port expansion. Retrieved November 12, 2015, from 
http://www.financeasia.com/News/394905,Indonesia-launches-massive-port-expansion.aspx 
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Specifically, Pelindo II operates twelve commercialized ports in ten provinces. The 
busiest port in Indonesia, Port Tanjung Priok, located in a sub-district of Jakarta, handled 102.5 
million tons of cargo in 2010.24  Although it handles over 2/3 of Indonesia’s entire world trade, 
the container traffic here is expected to grow by over 160% this year alone.25 The activity that 
this port usually encounters is cargo vessels and tankers. Due to the high amount of traffic, the 
dwell time is longer. This not only costs the businesses because the products are not getting 
shipped, but also costs the consumer due to the high demand for goods that are delayed.  
Indonesia – Current Actions to Mitigate Challenges and Issues  
The Indonesian government is increasing funding to upgrade port infrastructure. The 
Tanjung Priok Port is adding three new terminals as an extension called the Kalibaru Port to cut 
transport and handling time in half.26 This will increase overall productivity of the port. While 
Pelindos II is adding and expanding, Pelindos I for example, plans to modernize and expand 
ports over the next five years. 
The US Coast Guard press release dated January 02, 2013 reviews progress Indonesia has 
made in port security. This was release was after 34 Indonesian ports had been placed on the Port 
advisory list amidst repeated security concerns for a three period in 2005-2008.27  The US Coast 
Guard, as part of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS), found vast 
improvement following inspections conducted after Indonesia was placed on the advisory list. 
                                                          
24 WPS - Home Page. (n.d.). Retrieved November 11, 2015, from http://www.worldportsource.com/ 
25 Moving Cargo Faster in Indonesia's Main Sea Port. (2014, February 19). Retrieved December 2, 2015, from 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/02/19/moving-cargo-faster-in-indonesia-main-sea-port 
26 Dodd, C. (2015, February 28). Indonesia launches massive port expansion. Retrieved November 12, 2015, from 
http://www.financeasia.com/News/394905,Indonesia-launches-massive-port-expansion.aspx 
27 USCG, News Release. Indonesia Improves Port Security wit Coast Guard Assistance. (January 02, 2013), 14t 
District Hawaii & Pacific Public Affairs. Retrieved From: 
http://www.uscgnews.com/go/doc/4007/1671215/Indonesia-improves-port-security-with-Coast-Guard-assistance# 
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By 2011, all Indonesian ports were removed from further in depth inspection as antiterrorism 
measures had greatly improved.   
Recommended Improvements for Best Practices:   
Based on our review of selected Asian ports, two types of port security initiatives 
standout as key to improving U.S. port security; implementation of the ISPS Code abroad and 
U.S. partnerships which target specific port security technology and programs. Continued 
implementation and surveillance of the ISPS Code requirements at ports abroad was cited in 
three of the four countries studied as an essential factor in raising the overall port security level. 
The ISPS Code requirements apply to all parties involved in port operations; port authorities, 
governmental agencies, security teams, and private sector terminal operators and shippers. 
U.S. partnership examples were cited as key security initiatives for ports in the 
Philippines and Malaysia. Partnerships in the Philippines have helped fund specific technology 
to detect radioactive or nuclear materials and therefore prevent terrorist from using these as 
weapons of mass destruction. Malaysia partners with the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol in the 
implementation of the Container Security Initiative to target and pre-screen containers bound for 
the U.S. This initiative works through local port authorities, agencies and terminal operators to 
prevent suspect containers from being shipped to U.S. ports. Continuing to fund program and 
technology partnerships with foreign ports will have significant benefits to U.S. port security. 
